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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2(a)-
3(2)(j) inasmuch as this case was transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
First Issue 
Whether the evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient to establish that it 
was Ina C. Holman's intent to amend her trust with the Update to Trust of Ina C. Holman 
dated February 5, 2001? 
The standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard articulated in rule 52(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, rule 52(a) provides that "[findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a). According to the Utah Supreme 
Court, rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard is applied in the following manner: 
[T]he content of Rule 52(a)'s "clearly erroneous" standard, imported from the 
federal rule, requires that if the findings ... are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made, the findings ... will be set aside. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). See also In re Z.D. 147 P.3d 401, 405-
406 (Utah 2006). 
Second Issue 
Whether the trial court acted within its discretion by admitting into evidence the 
original and duplicate Updates to Trust of Ina C. Holman? 
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The standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Vigil v. Div of Child & Family 
Servs., 107 P.3d 716, 718 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). This Court explained, 'Trial courts are 
afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence; thus we will not 
disturb a trial court's ruling whether to admit or exclude evidence absent an abuse of 
discretion." Vigil, 107 P.3d at 718. In Gorostieta v. Parkinson, the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that "[t]he admissibility of an item of evidence is a legal question. However, 
the trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude 
evidence, and its ruling will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion." 17 
P.3d 1110, 1114 (Utah 2000) (internal quotations omitted). See also State v. Casias, 772 
P.2d 975, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In the absence of an abuse of discretion, the trial 
court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed.") 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rules: 
UTAH R. A P P . P. 24(a)(9) 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated ... (a)(9) An argument. The 
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to 
the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for 
such an award. 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, 
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses .... 
UTAH R.EVID. 1003 
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine 
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances 
it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case originally came before the trial court on the Petition for Construction of 
Trust Documents of Central Bank as trustee of the Ina C. Holman Family Trust ("Trust"). 
R. 43. The petition sought the construction of documents potentially affecting trust 
administration, including an Update to Trust of Ina C. Holman, dated February 5, 2001 
("Update to Trust"), because a dispute had arisen among the children of Ina Holman 
("Ina") concerning the interpretation, effect, and validity of the documents. R. 42. By its 
language, the Update to Trust purported to remove Robert Holman ("Robert"), Ina's son, 
from the Trust as both a beneficiary and a successor co-trustee on account of real estate, 
loans, and money Ina distributed to Robert in excess of his share of the estate. R. 14, 
Exhibits 2 & 9. 
Course of Proceedings 
Each of Ina's then-living children responded to the petition. R. 67, 70, & 73. The 
trial court set a one day evidentiary hearing for November 14, 2005. R. 83. Prior to the 
evidentiary hearing, two motions in limine were filed by Phyllis Hall ("Phyllis"), R. 253 
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& 280, and one by Kathleen Robinson ("Kathy"), Jenevieve Holman ("Jenny"), and the 
Spencer Family (R. Henry Spencer, Cindy Riley, Pam Gondola, Jana Hay, Sue Frampton, 
Beth Jeppson, John Spencer, Edith Dunn, Andrew Spencer, Heather Spencer, and Allison 
Mack, individually the eleven children of Marion Spencer, Ina's deceased daughter), R. 
305. On November 14, 2005, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing in which it 
received testimony from David McBeth, Lyle Gertsch, Kathy, Phyllis, Robert, Jenny, and 
Sue Frampton. R. 525, Official Certified Transcript ("Trans."), 2-4. Following the 
evidentiary hearing, Kathy, Jenny, and the Spencer Family filed with the trial court a 
Motion to Substitute Original Documents for Photocopies Received into Evidence as 
Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 9. R. 338. The parties provided the trial court with post-trial 
memoranda in lieu of closing arguments. R. 351, 458, & 464. 
Disposition in Court Below 
On December 23, 2005, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision stating the 
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 479. The trial court's 
Memorandum Decision addressed the issues raised at the evidentiary hearing by the 
parties, namely the construction and enforceability of the Update to Trust as well whether 
the Spencer Family was a beneficiary of the Trust. R. 472, 476. With regards to the 
construction and enforceability of the Update to Trust, the trial court determined that the 
Update to Trust was valid and that it was Ina's intent to create the Update to Trust. R. 
472-476. Specifically, the trial court determined that the Update to Trust was consistent 
with communications between Robert and Ina concerning the forgiveness of a debt owed 
by Robert to Ina in exchange for Robert trading his interest in the Trust. R. 474-475. 
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Additionally, the trial court determined that Ina executed the Update to Trust without 
being unduly influenced by Kathy and that Ina had the requisite capacity to execute the 
Update to Trust. R. 473-474. The trial court also determined that the Spencer Family was 
a beneficiary of the Trust based upon the clear language of the Trust and the pleadings of 
the parties. R. 469-472. The trial court also admitted into evidence the original Updates 
without admitting into evidence the affidavits of Kathy and Jenny that accompanied 
them. R. 477. Counsel for Central Bank subsequently prepared a Judgment which the trial 
court signed on March 16, 2006. R. 512. 
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review 
On July 27, 1990, Ina created the Trust. See Exhibit 1. At the time the trust was 
created, Ina had four living children: Kathy, Jenny, Phyllis, and Robert. See Exhibit 1, p. 
2. The Trust was a revocable trust which provided for Ina's maintenance during her life, 
and then distributed the trust estate to her children upon Ina's death. See Exhibit 1, p. 2-
4. Pursuant to the Trust document, Ina's children were beneficiaries and successor co-
trustees. See Exhibit 1, p. 5. 
Before and after the creation of the Trust, Robert received real estate, loans, and 
money from Ina which were equal to or in excess of Robert's share of Ina's estate. See 
Exhibit 2, 9 & 15. Among other things, Ina loaned to Robert $80,000. Trans. 181:17-21. 
Robert failed to make any payments on the loan, and the principal amount and interest 
eventually grew to more than $120,000. Trans. 182:6-16. Ina eventually instructed an 
attorney to contact Robert to foreclose on a trust deed securing the debt in October 1994. 
See Exhibit 13. 
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To resolve the issues related to the debt he owed Ina, Robert discussed with Ina his 
participation in the Trust. Trans. 184:20-185:13. Around the time of the foreclosure, 
Robert sent a letter to Ina. See Exhibit 15, Trans. 187:17-23. In the letter, Robert outlines 
a plan in which he would "trade [his] interest in the estate for the promissory note," 
which he calculated were nearly equivalent. See Exhibit 15 ff 2, 5; see also Trans. 
189:17-190:3. On October 21, 1994, Robert sent to his mother a letter outlining an 
agreement by which Robert would deliver to Ina a deed for certain property wiih the 
understanding that Ina would then forgive his debt and remove Robert from any wills or 
trusts then made or to be made. See Exhibit 16, Trans. 195:9-196:14. 
In January 2001, Ina was hospitalized after a fall. Trans. 98:9-99:5. After leaving 
the hospital, Ina lived with Jenny for ten to fourteen days. Trans. 258:19-22, 259:12-13. 
Ina then moved to Midway to live with Kathy. Trans. 101:1-2. 
During January and February 2001, Kathy and Ina spoke often. Trans. 280:7-11. 
Ina often expressed to Kathy concern about the condition of her family and the Trust. 
Trans. 280:10-11. Ina was concerned that the Trust was unevenly distributed because of 
distributions she had provided to Robert. Trans. 120:6-15, 120:23-122:22. Consequently, 
Ina decided to amend her trust to remove Robert. Trans. See Exhibits 2, 2A, 9 & 9A, f 3. 
With the assistance of Kathy, the Update to Trust was prepared. See Exhibits 2, 2 A, 9, & 
9A; Trans. 280:12-16. The Update to Trust provided, in part, the following: 
Since my son, Robert J. Holman, has previously received real estate, loans and 
money from me equal to or in excess of his share of my estate, his name is to be 
removed from my previously written trust, and he is to be excluded from sharing 
in the proceeds of any of my estate after my death. 
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Exhibits 2, 2A, 9, & 9A, j^ 3. Two original I Jpdates to Trust were prepared for Ina 's 
s i gna tu re I r ai i s 5 9:1 < 1 6 0:2 
On February 5, 2001 , L \ !c ( i^ r : - . -
was staying. Trans. 62:7-1 ' M? ( iertsch spoke w uli Ina and witnessed her sign the 
Updates to 1 rust. I;.u... i._ „ - o ; \ i . .wi s- iertsch said that Ina did not appear confused, 
was ver\ COIHMVIII > ' • •-• • , ilmn .tiiln nine In.i signed die 
I Jpdates to Trust. Trans. 65:5-15. At the time the Update to "I rust was signed, ina «, ould 
carry on a conversation, knew who her children were, and was aware of what property 
Rober t ' s relationship with Ina was strained in 2000 and 200 J ? • -^  """••• : > -
22. Robert said that during that time period he did not talk to his mother much, if at all. 
Tfiiii1. P " ltt- V Ruin rl learned ul I (ukt.e In l u r a ai ilic spring oi J-.H. .. n a n s . .o*> :-
23 , and received a copy in April 2002, frans. 170:1-13. 
In 2002, Ina was declared incapacitated. See Exhibits 3 & 4. The incapacitation 
• * ' : ; * * • * . ; . . ; M ; . / 1 4 . . 
In August 2002, Ina 's children prepared an aaree? * - l .*' •-
property would be sold off. See Exhibit 5. Even though Ina had removed Robert as a co-
!niii1«\ ainl ,i beneficial \ lie nancd I lie agreement as a trustee. ;->cc Exhibit 5. While he 
and his sisters were aware that Robert had p r n inush h i rn n i imsnl i, i mi usiei ihey 
continued to attempt to work as a family and to avoid discord. Trans. 9" . i 7-21, , ^ - 1 v, 
-.-7. . ;. ) . .;
 }i\ s e a t i n g Hie August 2002 agreement Ina ' s children were 
inniH h) iiLMi.e • <»••">•• - ..- / eef .ilmn I eue 'Ml .2 I 7U2:T 2M I 
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However, on account of their discomfort with it, Kathy and Jenny repudiated the 
agreement immediately after signing it. 116:11-117:4, 125:15-126:8. 
On March 31, 2005, Ina passed away. R. 42, % 4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In response to Robert's Brief of Appellant, Kathy, Jenny, and the Spencer Family 
(collectively, "the Appellees") assert that Robert failed to marshal evidence as required 
by rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Instead of presenting in 
comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of competent evidence introduced at the 
hearing which supports the trial court's findings concerning Ina's intent to amend the 
Trust and the evidence supporting the trial court's decision to admit the Update to Trust, 
Robert has simply presented those facts that militate against the trial court's findings. 
Given Robert's failure to marshal evidence as required by rule 24(a)(9), this Court should 
uphold the trial court's findings of fact concerning Ina's intent to amend her trust and 
find that the trial court acted within its discretion to admit the documents amending Ina's 
trust into evidence. 
The Appellees further argue that the trial court's finding of fact that Ina intended 
to amend her trust is supported by the clear weight of the evidence. Robert attempts to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding of intent by 
arguing that the trial court applied the wrong evidentiary standard. However, given that 
the proper evidentiary standard was included in the parties' pleadings and that the court 
never stated that it was applying the wrong evidentiary standard, this Court should 
assume that the trial court applied the proper evidentiary standard of clear and convincing 
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evidence. Significantly, the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the clear weiuhi 
( • c .*-i uu:hM:-.iraiLU n. i;u uuii^Mii. s Memorandum Decision, in which 
the bases for the trial court's finding of intei it on tl le pai t of lit la to ai nei id 1 lei I:i: i ist ar i 
articulated and well supported. 
Finally, the trial court acted reasonably and within its broad discretion when it 
admitted into ev idence the cii lplicate ai id Driginal I Jpdates to I i i ist at the time of tl ic 
hearing and following the close of evidence, respectively. Robert challenges the li i,il 
court's admission of the duplicate I Jpdates lo Trust as nmninL> contran u> rule '()().? of 
the T Jtah R i lies of Ev idence I lowev ei the] . o^piCh i ;; . . pdatc> iu Irust qtu :\ as 
duplicates under rule 1003, and, therefore, are admi^;! * ' 
originals. The determination that the duplicates are admissible is supported by the trial 
:'••': •.. > i- . *. u - ; \-»u a concemiii j, ;.' K « i • ithcn i ic\ i\ of the 
original Updates to Irusl. furthermore, luilouim1 *! -•* ' *i tin1 d il 
court acted reasonably and within its discretion when it admitted into evidence the 
oiigiu.il I lpd<iU;'. lui 11 ml u illiunil reopening the hearing un' iunher testimony. By that 
time, the trial court had already received extern c ir«diniuin MHieemim' IIIR; 1 ipdnte^ n» 
Trust, and, for that reason, additional testimony was not required. 
I. ' rhe Court of Appeals Should AITnriiii iln11 I'liiil n 'oini s JIHIJJIIM'III HiTuuse 
Appellant Robert Holman Failed to Maiisliul Iv i idtim i 
In his Brief of Appellant. Robert Holman f ;Roberf} c*>mnletel\ failed to marshal 
i" -!'^'\ --i: .. -:;. v
 ;;.ts oi Appellate iYoLeduiL. = ur that reason, the Coi irt 
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of Appeals should affirm the trial court's judgment and refuse to disturb the trial court's 
findings of fact. 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure addresses, in part, the content 
required in an appellant's brief. It requires that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." UTAH R. APP. P. 
24(a)(9). The Utah Supreme Court explained that to meet the rule 24(a)(9) requirement, 
"parties protesting findings of fact must marshal all the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." United Park City Mines 
Co. v. Stitching Mayflower Ml Fonds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 2006) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
In West Valley City v. Hoskins, this Court explained that marshaling requires the 
following: 
[T]he challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, 
the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw 
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting 
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
51 P.3d 52, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). As this Court explained, 
the duty of an appellant to marshal the evidence is a "critical requirement of appellate 
advocacy." West Valley City, 51 P.3d at 54. 
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1 his Court also explained that a failure to marshal evidence as required by r ule 
294 (Utah.Ct. APP ' w ^ » In Houditon, the Court e>- - • Whm . ••• 
marshal the e\idence. v\e need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the 
fine.mp ... A I .;.o., ,1/iu; ^ yk Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636, 
642 (Utah u . *. " ' ' " ' - ill uphold flu, trial anul"-, liiidin^sol lad il IL \)lw\\ 
challenging the Iindings fails to appropriately marshal all the evidence."); Saunders v. 
Sharp "---i _u >_ -. •* J » * ' A r r 1990) (Burden of marshaling evidence "is a 
!
 . - • • * marshaling the 
evidence, we re i use to consider the merits of challenges iu me iindings and accept I In 
findings as valid."). The Utah Supreme Court explained that "[i]f an appellant argues that 
appellee; rather, the appellee may prove that the appellant did nut nu-i * u; • m -i h ; . 
'burden by presenting a 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the district enun's finding." 
/>- • • . .-. »• « !/. Supply, Inc. i;i" f ) adan 
Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002)). 
The case of Par duhn v. Bennett provides an excellent example of the 
uHisafiienees stemming from hulim.1 lo niai.sliul St\ I 11 P,:ui I 9 \ :>U 4 o()4 (1 'tali 
2005). InParduhn, two individuals entered into a partnership agreemei it (" Agreement") 
for the purpose of owning-and operating a gas station. Id. at 498. The Agreement 
:<0 • ^.. pi;.'. iMv-n .,.ai iiU«,>^i ror continuing the partnership in the event a 
partner die f /. - ' * * ^ - - . i **' < : • .• ; ' ,::;. n\ 
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contemplated that each partner would purchase a life insurance policy designating the 
other as beneficiary. Upon the death of one of the partners, the surviving partner would 
use the proceeds from the insurance policy to purchase the deceased partner's interest in 
the partnership from the deceased partner's heirs." Id. 
In 1997, the partners sold the gas stations comprising their business. Id. That same 
year, one of the partners passed away ("decedent"). Id. The decedent's heirs claimed the 
life insurance proceeds while the surviving partner claimed that he was entitled to the 
policy proceeds. Id. at 499. The trial court ultimately awarded the life insurance proceeds 
to the decedent's heirs. Id. It held that the decedent intended his heirs, and not his 
surviving partner, to receive the proceeds. Id. at 499-500. 
The surviving partner challenged the trial court's subsidiary findings of fact 
related to the trial court's ultimate finding of fact concerning the decedent's intent. See id. 
at 502-03. Among other things, the surviving partner asserted that the trial court 
erroneously found that the partners sold their partnership and its assets, and that the 
partners treated the partnership casually. Id. at 503. 
In addressing the surviving partner's challenge of the trial court's findings of fact 
related to the decedent's intent, the Utah Supreme Court explained, "To successfully 
challenge that ultimate finding [of intent], [the surviving partner] should have marshaled 
all of the remaining evidence supporting it and then demonstrated why that evidence 4is 
legally insufficient to support it even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the 
court below.'" Id. at 504 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (Utah 2004)). 
The Utah Supreme Court then continued by explaining that the surviving partner had not 
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marshaled the evidence. Parduhn, 112 P.3d at 504. The surviving partner simply had 
pro\ aicu d\\ aduciidujii iw iii i hue! A.ih "Miost o! th*. u^cuments on which the district 
court relied in iiiakim» lis lindni" nt inlnn milium i.>pl,iimn \\\\\ ilm ni'.tl i nil rnn l 
in interpreting the evidence as it did." Id. 
1 he I ) tali Supreme Court explained that the surviving partner's attempt fell far 
shorl i*l Ihc miu'slulni!.' H e\ idrnee lupmed h I 'liili appellate aniils Li ll explained: 
To appropriately marshal evidence, parties must provide a precisely focused 
summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they challenge. This 
summary must correlate all particular items of evidence with tin challenged 
findings and then convince us that the trial court erred in the assessment of that 
evidence to its findings. Indeed parties challenging factual finding rrmct f} jjiy 
embrace the adversary's position and play devil's advocate. 
Rather than meeting this high burden, [the surviving partner! simply presents 
those facts that militate against the district court's finding of intent—a strategy we 
have previously found to be insufficient. 
hi. at 504 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). As a consequence of the 
• . - " • , • - •[ . e Mipponmg [u^
 t .miing 
of intent, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the surviving partner's arguments iv! if, -' ' 
the findings of fact. .A /. 
- ',,..•'.•'.. . . l . , .'.AS l a l l c d U , , ,ar:,llui a n v 
evidence as required by rule 24(a )(VJ K Robert has asserted two r- -ii^ *r. *lrst 
is a challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court's factual findings that Ina Holman 
:• T . . . , . ; . . . . . ! . • • . , Uiv. Update to 
the 1 rust oflna C. Holman dated = • - ; - • • " 
Brief, 4. The second is that the trial court erred by receiving into evidence the originals 
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and duplicates of the Update to Trust because Robert disputes their authenticity. 
Appellant's Brief, 5. 
In laying out the facts that allegedly support the two issues identified in his appeal, 
Robert failed to identify the facts upon which the trial court relied to determine that Ina 
intended to amend her trust and that the Update to Trust was authentic. Instead, Robert 
simply identified for the appellate court the same arguments and facts previously 
identified in his pleadings and at the time of the hearing concerning alleged 
inconsistencies in the actions of Kathleen Robinson ("Kathy") following Ina's execution 
of the Update to Trust. 
Robert marshaled none of the evidence identified in the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision in support of the trial court's finding that it was Ina's intent to amend her trust. 
For example, Robert makes no mention of the nearly $124,000.00 he owed to his mother 
that was discussed in a 1994 letter to his mother, see Exhibit 15 ^ f 15, and in his testimony 
at the time of the hearing, see Trans. 182:6-16. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial 
court discussed extensively the offers made by Robert in his 1994 letter to exchange his 
interest in Ina's trust for the forgiveness by Ina of his debt. See R. 475; Trans. 189:17— 
190:3. Robert also fails to marshal for this Court a subsequent letter entered into evidence 
and discussed by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision in which Robert more 
specifically outlined his request for forgiveness of the debt owed by him to Ina in 
exchange for his removal from Ina's trust. See R. 474; Exhibit 16; Trans. 195:9-196:14. 
Robert also failed to discuss the actual language of Ina's amendment, also relied 
upon by the trial court, which expressly states Ina's reasons for amending the Trust. See 
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R. 474; Exhibits 2, 2A, 9, & 9A, ^ 3. Specifically, the Update ' . Trust provides ilu: 
follo\ v i rig: 
Since my son, Robert J. Holman, has previously received real estate, loans and 
money from me equal to or in excess of his share of my estate, his name is to be 
removed from my previously written trust, and he is to be excluded from sharing 
in the proceeds of any of my estate after my death. 
See Exhibits 2, 2A, 9, & 9A, 1] 3. 
The evidence presented by Robert to this Court u; hi** buef does not describe the 
testir.. .:;.*<.<. ic:i^;.. t i - puhiu notary vuu> w itnessed Ina's execution of the two 
original update^ to Inr;* - . • * : . • i : not confi lsed , ai id 
carried on a good conversation, with him at the time of the execution. See Trans. 62:7-11, 
OJ.:^J. - XWI-LII di:>w laji > if idcuiii v testimony given that in 2001 Ina could carry on 
a con\ ersatior- • ! n IW ere <•> • ••• • : • * • 1. 
Trans 1 I ^ -o- l S. ."" i i ^ -272 :22 . 1 lowever , as Robe r t testified, n wou ld have been 
d - n k . u a i^i iw . -v^ ^.i^.v-.v in,> m o i h u s capaci ty at the t ime she s igned the Update to 
' fn ist because hi; "\ i elatic )i is"! rii i "< \ it! i Ti ta... \ \ ra, ;, strained in 2000 and 2001 a i i i 1 le talked \ ei y 
little with her. if ai .<li h ;ms ! ""W>-y, 15-22. 
In In . i)n^.i. iw;i^ii i u u n a i extensively on agreements and actions following Ihr 
Update hi fni'il iiiiii "»,\ liioli knl ln .mini l enn i n r I l o l n u m ICIIIIN i 1 rcatciJ Kobcn as a co-
trustee and/or beneficiary of the 'rrust. However , Robert provided this Court with none of 
Ka thy ' s testimony m which she explained that the purpose of her actions following Ina 's 
execution I iT fl . • ;: o| I i u a n a s HO noil , n IIIII Kobcn and Mis His I lull <"w 1 * h \ His ) as 
family members and to avoid discord in the fauin \, 
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testimony that he and his sisters were really trying to figure out a way to manage things 
and get along, Trans. 201:24-202:4, 214:1-7. 
Given his failure to marshal, and the fact that the above evidence comprises much 
more than a "scintilla" of evidence in support of the trial court's decision, this Court 
should uphold the trial court's findings of fact concerning Ina's intent to amend the Trust 
and concerning the authenticity of the Update to Trust. 
II. Trial Court's Findings of Fact Concerning Ina Holman's Intent to Modify the 
Trust Are Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
The trial court's findings that the Update to Trust implemented Ina's intent are not 
against the clear weight of the evidence presented to the trial court at the hearing. In his 
brief, Robert argues that the trial court applied the wrong evidentiary standard in finding 
that the Update to Trust reflected Ina's intent. Specifically, Robert argued that the trial 
court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a clear and convincing 
evidence standard in finding that it was Ina's intent to amend her trust. In support of this 
argument, Robert asserts that the trial court must have applied the preponderance of the 
evidence standard for the following reasons: 1) the trial court did not expressly state the 
evidentiary standard that it applied, and 2) the trial court did not expressly address in its 
Memorandum Decision Kathy's actions following the execution of the Update to Trust. 
However, the following demonstrates that in spite of Robert's attempts to frame 
this issue as a question of whether the trial court applied the proper evidentiary standard, 
he is really challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's factual 
findings, and, as such, the trial court's factual findings should not be overturned unless 
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they are against the clear weight of the c\ idence in the record. Furthermore, in the 
absence of any express statemer.i i - \m. .• uii u 'dn nuii it applied a specific evidentiary 
standard. With regards to Robert's assertion that the trial court's findings are insufficient 
given, that they do not specifically address certain actions taken by Kathy, the trial court 
nie1 ills bunion lb piv VHIIIIJJ .nilin nil! <lol.nl in ih. I slcnioraiidun] Decision to make the 
basis of its decision clear. Significantly, the trial court's Memorandum,,, Decision clearly 
illustrates that its findings concerning Ina's intent were supported by the weight of the 
e\ idence. Each of the abo v e issues is addressed ,n him 
A. Robert Holman's Appeal Challenges the Trial Court's Factui i f Findii igs 
and not the Evidentiary Standard Employed by the Court. 
This Court should not overturn, the trial court's finding that it was Ina's in ton i u> 
inndih 1KM 11"IIsI In e\i Indt Kuhul bcumsc il is inp|>mltd l>\ llir tlcai neigliioi the 
evidence. See UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a). Robert presents his first issue on appeal to this • 
Court as a failure on the part of the trial court to apply the correct evidentiary standard. 
See Apf)c/liu(l 'v Rnv/, -1 Speci'lii. nlh in dc-,.Li iliiiij his hr.l issue, Robert states the 
following: "Whether the Trial Court Erred in Appkim.' *m kipr^rer Evidentiar Si; i . ; 
in Determining Whether the Purported Amendment was Indeed Part of Grantor's Trust " 
:: , •*. .
 v
 '• .IN>V il- .ti|:.icu a u^s-stringent 
preponderance of the evidence standard" because the triai n*-vT ' >.:v ' 
proper consideration to provided testimony showing inconsistencies between [Kathy's] 
• -.,;. ; ...v.u;u.. ..iv. . uncnument and her prior actioi is. ni. 
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However, Robert's suggestion that the trial court applied the wrong standard is in 
reality an attempt to attack the sufficiency of the trial court's factual findings. Robert 
explained that the burden of proof concerning Ina's intent to modify her trust was not 
preponderance of the evidence, but clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 16. He then 
states, "Unfortunately, the Trial Court does not state in its Memorandum Decision or 
elsewhere the standard of proof it employed. An examination of the Decision and the 
Transcript strongly suggest that it applied the lower preponderance standard." Id. at 16-
17. In other words, Robert is arguing that while the trial court at no point states that it is 
applying the wrong evidentiary standard, it must have applied the preponderance of the 
evidence standard because the evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact. 
The fact that Robert is attempting to present a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence argument to this Court as a failure of the trial court to apply the proper 
evidentiary standard is best illustrated by Robert's last paragraph in section I of his 
argument. See Appellant's Brief, 20. Robert concludes by asserting the following: 
Although this Court typically does not question the weight and credibility to be 
given to evidence, it needs to ensure that the trial court applies the proper 
evidentiary standard. The fact that the Trial Court failed to even mention any of 
the above inconsistencies in reaching its decision suggests that it failed to even 
consider them. This infers that the Trial Court applied the lower preponderance of 
the evidence standard. 
Id. Given that Robert's appeal concerning Ina's intent to modify her trust is really a 
challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the trial court based its decision, 
this Court should review the trial court's factual findings pursuant to rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments that the rule 52(a) clearly 
erroneous standard should be applied to this case is Robert's own assertion that it applies. 
Specifically, Robert told this Court that in determining "whether the trial court erred in 
applying an improper evidentiary standard in determining whether the purported 
amendment was indeed part of grantor's trust," that the appropriate "appellate standard of 
review ... is the 'clearly erroneous' standard." See Appellant's Brief, 4-5. Given that 
Robert is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's factual 
findings, the Court should affirm the trial court because its findings of fact are not against 
the clear weight of the evidence in the record. 
B. The Trial Court's Finding of Intent on the Part oflna Holman to Modify 
Her Trust Is Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
While Robert suggests that Kathy's behavior following the creation of the Update 
to Trust does not support a finding of intent to amend the Trust on the part oflna, the trial 
court was presented clear and convincing evidence supporting Ina's intent. 
The standard for determining the sufficiency of factual findings by a trial court is 
set out in rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It provides, in part, the following: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .... 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
The Utah Supreme Court explained in State v. Walker, shortly after Utah adopted 
rule 52, how rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard is applied in practice: 
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[T]he content of Rule 52(a)5s "clearly erroneous" standard, imported from the 
federal rule, requires that if the findings ... are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made, the findings ... will be set aside. 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its articulation of 
the clearly erroneous standard as explained in Walker in the matter of In re Z.D. See 147 
P.3d 401, 405-406 (Utah 2006) ("We provided sound guidance to appellate courts 
regarding the scope of their authority to review factual findings under the clearly 
erroneous standard of rule 52(a) in State v. Walker ...."). 
The Utah Supreme Court also shed additional light on how to apply the clearly 
erroneous standard in its decision in In re Z.D. See 147 P.3d at 406. For example, the 
Supreme Court explained that when an appellate court is reviewing the sufficiency of 
evidence, it is unrealistic to expect the appellate court to do so without weighing the 
evidence. See id. The Court continued by explaining that u[t]he appellate court must, 
however, go about weighing the evidence with one eye on the scales and the other fixed 
firmly on its duty of deference to findings of fact." Id. With one eye firmly fixed on its 
deference to the trial court, the appellate court "may only disturb findings that offend the 
'clear weight' of the evidence." Id. Significantly, "[a]n appellate court must be capable of 
discriminating between discomfort over a trial court's findings of fact—which it must 
tolerate—and those that require the court's intercession. It must forbear the 'close call.'" 
Id} 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court also quoted Judge Richard Posner's decision in Carr v. Allison 
Gas Turbine Div. Gen. Motors to illustrate the "practical meaning" of rule 52(a). See In 
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The Utah Supreme Court explained two additional principles relating to the 
application of rule 52(a) to this case: (1) the required review of the record in determining 
whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, and (2) the relationship of a heightened 
standard of proof as part of the clearly erroneous review. In re Z.D., 147 P.3d at 406-07. 
First, concerning the review of the record, the Utah Supreme Court explained that in 
determining whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous it is the responsibility of the 
appellate court to review the record. Id. at 407. Specifically, the Court held: 
It is, therefore, the responsibility of the appellate court to provide some indication 
that it performed its sufficiency of the evidence review in the context of the whole 
record, or at least that portion of the record to which its attention was drawn by 
the appellant's marshaling obligation or the appellee's response to the appellant's 
marshaled evidence. 
Id2 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court explained that "[i]t is also appropriate when 
evaluating whether a result was 'clearly erroneous' for the reviewing court to consider 
the standard of proof the prevailing party below was required to meet." In re Z.D., 147 
re Z.D., 147 P.3d at 406 (quoting Carr, 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir. 1994)). The quote is 
as follows: 
[The rule 52(a) standard] requires us appellate judges to distinguish between the 
situation" in which we think that if we had been the trier of fact we would have 
decided the case differently and the situation in which we are firmly convinced 
that we would have done so. Our scrutiny of the district judge's findings of fact 
thus is deferential, but it is not abject. As the Supreme Court pointed out in the 
Concrete Pipe case, we need not, to overturn a finding under the clear-error 
standard, adjudge the finding "so unlikely that no reasonable person would find it 
to be true." 
In re Z.D., 147 P.3d at 406 (quoting Carr, 32 F.3d at 1008) (emphasis in original). 
2
 This requirement underscores the significance of Robert's failure to marshal as required 
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) as explained above. 
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P.3d at 407 (citing Lovett v. Cont Bank & Trust Co., 286 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1955)). 
The practical result of considering the standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence in 
this case, is that "[t]he amount and quality of evidence required to sustain a result based 
on a preponderance of evidence is, of course, less than that required to meet a clear and 
convincing standard." In re Z.D., 147 P.3d at 407. Consequently, it is less difficult to 
demonstrate the insufficiency of evidence where the trial court was to employ a clear and 
convincing evidence standard. See id. The Utah Supreme Court concluded its discussion 
of the relationship of the evidentiary standard applied by the trial court and the clearly 
erroneous standard used by the appellate court as follows: 
Still, it is not the role of the appellate court to reverse a trial court merely because 
it is convinced that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the result under the 
standard of proof applied below. Walker demands more. The result must be 
against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with a firm 
and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
One case that provides some insight into the application of the rule 52(a) clearly 
erroneous standard is the case of In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). In 
Estate ofBartell, a wife sued the estate of her deceased spouse seeking a declaration that 
she was an "omitted spouse" given that she married her deceased husband after the 
creation of his will. Id. at 885. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the 
deceased husband intended to provide for his wife through transfers outside his will. Id. 
The trial court received and examined evidence concerning the deceased husband's intent 
concerning his wife. Id. at 885-86. The trial court examined the statements made by the 
deceased husband concerning his intent, the transfers made by the husband to the wife 
27 
prior to his death, the size of the estate relative to the transfers, and the husband's 
understanding that he was able to change his will. Id. Specifically, the trial court 
determined that the husband's statements concerning his intent were ambiguous, that he 
had transferred $230,000 to his wife in the years immediately preceding his death, that 
his estate consisted of only about $100,000, and that he was "sufficiently astute in 
business matters to have changed his will." Id. 
The surviving wife attacked the trial court's findings. Id at 886. In reviewing the 
wife's attacks, the Utah Supreme Court explained the applicable standard under rule 
52(a) and Walker. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that "great deference is 
given to the trial court's findings, especially when they are based on an evaluation of 
conflicting live testimony." In re Estate ofBartell, 116 P.2d at 886 (citing Walker, 743 
P.2d at 192-93; UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a)). The Utah Supreme Court explained that in 
attempting to demonstrate to the appellate court that the trial court was mistaken in its 
findings concerning the deceased husband's intent, the surviving wife "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re Estate ofBartell, 116 P.2d at 886 
(citing Walker, 743 P.2d at 193) (internal quotations omitted). 
In light of the marshaling requirement and the clearly erroneous standard, the Utah 
Supreme Court held the following: 
In this case, [the surviving wife] has not even attempted to marshal the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings, nor has she attempted to demonstrate that 
the trial court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, as required 
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by Walker. Instead, she has essentially reargued the factual case submitted below, 
construing all evidence in a light most favorable to her case and largely ignoring 
the evidence supportive of the trial court's findings. 
In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d at 886. Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court was left 
uto rely heavily on the presumption of correctness that attends |the trial court's] findings 
under rule 52(a)." Id. In the end, the Utah Supreme Court held that it had considered the 
evidence and was "not persuaded that the trial court's findings regarding the decedent's 
intent was clearly erroneous." Id. 
While the instant case does not deal with an omitted spouse or the related statute, 
it does involve a son—Robert—who claims it was not his mother's intent to omit him 
from her trust. However, as in the case of In re Estate ofBartell, the trial court in this 
matter pointed to specific evidence that supported its findings that it was Ina's intention 
to amend her trust to remove Robert. R. 472-475. Similar to In re Estate ofBartell, the 
trial court in this case examined the statements made by Ina concerning her intentions 
related to her son, the transfers made by Ina to Robert prior to the Update of Trust, the 
size of the estate relative to the transfers, and Ina's independent control of her finances 
until she was declared incapacitated in 2002. See id. 
Intent is manifest in this case by something much more convincing than lack of 
action as in the case of In re Estate ofBartell. Specifically, Ina's intentions are clearly 
spelled out in the Update to Trust. See Exhibits 2, 2A, 9 & 9A, J^ 3. Furthermore, the 
evidence supports the trial court's finding that Ina possessed the capacity to amend her 
Trust at the time, being very aware of her property and her family. Trans. 119:6-18, 
271:19-272:22. 
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Robert's arguments concerning Ina's intent to amend her trust focus almost 
exclusively on the actions of Kathy, and not on Ina. Robert discusses extensively 
agreements and actions involving his sisters following the Update to Trust in which 
Kathy and Jenny arguably treated Robert as a co-trustee and/or beneficiary of the Trust. 
However, Kathy and Jenny testified that the purpose of their actions following Ina's 
execution of the Update of Trust was to work with Robert and Phyllis as family members 
and to avoid discord in the family, which is consistent with Robert's own testimony. See 
Trans. 97:7-21, 135:6-20, 201:24-202:4, 214:1-7. In presenting his appeal, Robert has 
"essentially reargued the factual case submitted below, construing all evidence in a light 
most favorable to [his] case and largely ignoring the evidence supportive of the trial 
court's findings" that Ina intended to amend her trust. See In re Estate ofBartell, 779 
P.2dat886. 
In this case, the trial court had ample and clear evidence to provide a sufficient 
basis for its finding that Ina intended to exclude Robert from her trust based on, among 
other things, past distributions made by Ina to Robert. 
C. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision Adequately Demonstrates the 
Basis for Its Determination that Ina Holman Intended to Amend Her Trust. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court clearly stated its bases for finding that 
it was Ina's intent to amend her trust to remove Robert. Robert has asserted that the 
evidence did not support the trial court's factual findings because, in part, the trial court 
did not expressly address certain actions taken by Kathy following Ina's amendment of 
her trust. However, the Memorandum Decision provided a sufficiently detailed 
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description of the trial court's bases for ruling as it did, even though the Memorandum 
Decision did not negate each argument made by Robert point by point. Furthermore, 
Kathy's actions following the execution of the Update to Trust are irrelevant to Ina's 
intent at the time Ina executed the Update to Trust. 
This Court explained that "[i]n a bench trial, the [trial] court must set forth the 
reasons for its decision in enough detail for the reviewing court to determine whether 
they are clearly erroneous." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 973 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
This Court continued by explaining that the "finding must be adequate to ensure the trial 
court's discretionary determination was rationally based." Id. (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). "To provide meaningful appellate review, the trial court's findings 
must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the 
evidence upon which they are grounded." N.T. v. State, 928 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
However, "a trial court is not required to recite each indicia of reasoning that leads 
to its conclusions, nor is it required to marshal the evidence in support of them." Id. 
(quoting In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996)). Furthermore, "a trial court 
is also not required to explain why it found certain witnesses less credible or why some 
testimony was given less weight or considered irrelevant." NT, 928 P.2d at 399. The 
Utah Supreme Court explained, 
A trial court need not resolve every conflicting evidentiary issue, nor is the court 
required to negate allegations in its findings of fact. Rather, the trial court's 
factual findings must be articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of the 
ultimate conclusion can be understood. 
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Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 521 (Utah 
1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoted by D.J. Invest. Group, LLC, v. 
DAE/Westbrook, LLC, 147 P.3d 414, 422-23 (Utah 2006)). After determining that the 
trial court's memorandum decision and findings in Consolidation Coal Co. were "well-
reasoned and fully supported by the record," the Utah Supreme Court held, "It was not 
necessary for the trial court to negate [appellant's] version of the case point by point. The 
trial court needed to make only those findings necessary to its decision ..." Id. 
In this case, the trial court articulated its factual findings with sufficient detail so 
as to leave no doubt as the basis for its ultimate conclusion that it was Ina's intent to 
amend her trust to remove Robert. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court made ten 
numbered factual findings. R. 476-477. Among those specific findings of fact, the trial 
court determined that Ina executed the Update to Trust. R. 476. The trial court also listed 
facts upon which it relied throughout its conclusions of law. R. 467-476. 
The trial court discusses specific facts that serve to provide sufficient detail to its 
basis for determining that it was Ina's intent to amend her trust. For example, the trial 
court discusses the fact that Robert borrowed money totaling $124,000 from his mother, 
that Ina and Robert entered into an understanding by which Ina would forgive the debt in 
exchange for removing Robert from the trust, and that Robert was sending 
3
 In applying the federal rule upon which Utah's Rule 52(a) is based, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that "to be adequate, factual findings 
need only be explicit enough to give this court a clear understanding of the basis of the 
district court's decision and to enable us to determine the grounds on which the district 
court reached its decision." Toombs v. Leone, 111 F.2d 465, 469 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(responding to appellant's assertion that findings of fact are inadequate because they are 
mixed with court's conclusions of law). 
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communications to Ina consistent with this understanding. See R. 474-475. The trial 
court also identifies other relevant facts, such as the lack of any record that Robert ever 
repaid his debt to Ina and the specific language of the amendment. Id, 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision then specifically addresses Robert's 
assertions that Ina's amendment to her trust was a product of undue influence exercised 
by Kathy and/or a lack of capacity on the part of Ina.4 See R. 472-474. In so doing, the 
trial court specifically addresses those facts that refute Robert's assertion that Ina was 
unduly influenced. For example, the trial court points out that the Update to Trust 
mirrored Robert's own correspondence, that Robert's wife and Ina did not get along, and 
that Robert had not communicated much, if at all, with Ina in the two years prior to the 
amendment. R. 474. In discussing the alleged lack of capacity, the trial court pointed out 
that Robert was not present in Utah and was not in a position to testify about Ina's lack of 
intent, and that each of the children testified that Ina maintained control over her financial 
assets until she was declared incapacitated in 2002. R. 473-474. These factual findings 
identified by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision serve to provide sufficient detail 
to demonstrate to this Court that the trial court's decision was well-reasoned and fully 
supported. 
Significantly, as asserted by Robert, the trial court did not negate Robert's version 
of the case point by point. For example, the trial court did not address interactions 
between Kathy and Robert following Ina's the Update to Trust in which Kathy treated 
4
 Based on Utah law, Robert would have likely been required to prove undue influence by 
clear and convincing evidence. See Russell v. Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 999 n.2 (Utah 1993). 
Robert as a successor co-trustee or that Kathy allegedly attempted to conceal the 
amendment from Robert. However, the Utah Supreme Court does not require the trial 
court to negate Robert's case point by point. More importantly, Kathy's actions following 
the execution of the Update to Trust are irrelevant in determining whether Ina intended to 
amend her Trust. Given their lack of relevance, the trial court understandably declined to 
comment on Kathy's actions. For those reasons, the trial court's Memorandum Decision 
more than adequately provides the trial court's basis and refutes Robert's arguments and 
should be affirmed. 
D. Assumption that Trial Court Applied Correct Evidentiary Standard. 
Where the trial court in this matter did not expressly state the evidentiary standard 
it was using, the proper assumption is that the trial court applied the correct evidentiary 
standard in finding that it was Ina's intent to modify her trust to exclude Robert. Robert 
has asserted, in part, that the trial court's failure to state the specific evidentiary standard 
lends itself to the presumption that the trial court applied the lower standard of 
preponderance of the evidence rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard. 
See Appellant's Brief, 13, 16-17. However, no grounds exist for creating that 
presumption. 
Where a trial court does not expressly state the standard of evidence employed in 
reaching its decision, appellate courts generally assume that the trial court used the 
correct standard. See, e.g., Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement Sys. v. Gallion, 65 P.3d 
876, 883-84 (Alaska 2003). For example, the Alaska Supreme Court was asked to review 
whether a "court failed to apply the reasonable doubt standard of proof." Id. at 883. An 
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appellant challenged the Alaska trial court, in part, because it had failed to state the 
standard of proof it applied in a contempt proceeding. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court held 
the following: 
We have held in other contexts that a trial court need not explicitly state all of its 
factual findings so long as its findings are adequate to reveal its reasoning 
process. Courts elsewhere have held that a trial court need not explicitly state the 
standard of proof it is applying if there is no dispute about the applicable standard. 
We will normally assume that the trial court has applied the correct 
standard. 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Alaska ruling is 
consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Toledo, 763 A.2d 
28, 32 (Conn. Ct. App. 2000) (We must... assume that the court applied the correct 
standard of proof in the present case.'5); In re CT, 724 A.2d 590, 597 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1999) ("Absent any indication to the contrary, we presume that the trial judge knew the 
proper standard of proof to apply and did in fact apply it."); Gluth Bros. Constr., Inc. v. 
Union Nat. Bank, 518 N.E.2d 1345, 1350 (111. Ct. App. 1988); Smith v. Bull Run Sch. 
Dist, 722 P.2d 27, 30 (Ore. Ct. App. 1986); Ross v. Superior Court, 569 P.2d 727, 737 
(Cal. 1977); People v. Tuschen, 2007 Cal App. Unpub. Lexis 7251, 5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
Furthermore, the discussion of the clear and convincing standard in the parties' 
pleadings provides further evidence that the trial court knew the proper evidentiary 
standard and applied it. For instance, in an unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals 
opinion, an appellant challenged a trial court's decision by arguing "that the district court 
failed to require that [appellee] prove undue influence by 'clear and convincing evidence' 
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because the standard of proof is not mentioned in the district court's order." In re Estate 
ofReichenberger, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. Lexis 315, 9-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held, "But the failure of the district court to 
mention this standard of proof in its order does not, ipso facto, establish that the district 
court did not require it, particularly when it was briefed and argued by both parties." Id. 
at 10. 
As in the case of In re Estate ofReichenberger, the parties in this case argued to 
the trial court that the applicable evidentiary standard for determining Ina's intent to 
modify the trust was the clear and convincing standard. For example, Phyllis filed her 
Motions in Limine with the trial court on November 10, 2005. R. 280. In her motion, 
Phyllis moved the trial court to apply the clear and convincing standard to Ina's intent to 
modify the trust. R. 280, f^ 2. In reply, Kathy and Jenny, while opposing other portions of 
Phyllis's motion, did not oppose the portion concerning the clear and convincing 
evidence standard. See R. 298-303, at 299. Additionally, in two of the post trial 
memoranda requested by the trial court, the parties outlined the applicability of the clear 
and convincing evidentiary standard. See R. 358-384, at 377 (Phyllis); R. 385-458, 450 
(Appellees). Given that the parties had briefed the trial court on the proper standard, this 
Court should assume the trial court knew and applied the clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard with regards to Ina's intent to modify her trust, and rule accordingly. 
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III. The Trial Court Was Within Its Broad Discretion to Admit Evidence When It 
Admitted the Duplicate and Original Updates to Trust of Ina C. Holman. 
While he cites other issues, Robert's objection to Exhibits 2, 2A, 9, and 9 A can be 
summarized as follows. First, Robert objects to Exhibits 2 and 9, the photocopies of the 
Update to Trust, because he disputes the authenticity of the original Update to Trust. 
Second, Robert objects to Exhibits 2A and 9A, the originals of the Update to Trust, 
because they were admitted into evidence following the close of the subject hearing. 
Based on the extensive testimony received by the trial court concerning the Update 
to Trust, no genuine question existed as to the authenticity of the original Update to Trust 
that would have precluded admission of the photocopies, Exhibits 2 and 9, into evidence 
by the trial court. Furthermore, the trial court's decision to admit Exhibits 2A and 9A into 
evidence following the hearing without receiving additional testimony on the documents 
was within the trial court's discretion given the extensive testimony concerning the 
documents at the time of the hearing. 
A. No Genuine Question Concerning Authenticity Exists that Would Merit 
Exclusion of the Updates to Trust from Evidence. 
At the time of the hearing, no genuine question existed concerning the authenticity 
of the Update to Trust that would have precluded the trial court from admitting the 
duplicates and the originals of the Update to Trust into evidence. Robert has asserted that 
the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Exhibits 2 and 9 because the parties were 
"only able to produce photocopies of [the] documents" at the time of the hearing and 
because appellant's counsel "doubted the authenticity of the originals." Appellant's Brief 
21. Robert has based his objections upon rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "[t]o prove the content of a 
writing ..., the original writing ... is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules 
or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by Statute." UTAH R. 
EviD. 1002. Rule 1003 then provides for the interchangeability of duplicates with 
originals. See UTAH R. EviD. 1003. It states that "[a] duplicate is admissible to the same 
extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the 
original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the 
original.55 UTAH R. EVID. 1003.5 
In discussing the federal rule that is the equivalent of Utah's best evidence rule, 
Weinstein5s Federal Evidence explains, "Duplicates may ordinarily be admitted to the 
same extent as originals. The concept of the 'duplicate5 broadens the concept of the 
original to include mechanical reproductions produced by modern technology that further 
the goal of preciseness that is still paramount when dealing with writings ..,.55 
WEINSTEIN5S FED. EVID. § 1002.04(3).6 
5
 In rule 1001, the Utah Rules of Evidence define "duplicate55 as "a counterpart produced 
by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of 
photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic 
recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which 
accurately reproduce the original.55 UTAH R. EviD. 1001(4). 
6
 "Once authenticity and fairness issues are resolved, duplicates and originals are 
generally interchangeable for evidentiary purposes. For example, a duplicate is 
admissible when the opposing party concedes its accuracy. Even when accuracy is not 
conceded, courts routinely accept duplicates as a convenience to the court and the parties 
unless there are persuasive reasons for rejecting the evidence. Thus if there is no reason 
to believe that the duplicate is inaccurate or that a party is attempting to commit a fraud 
on the court, for example, by altering the proffered evidence, the duplicate will be 
admitted.55 WEINSTEIN5S FED. EVID. § 1003.02[1]. 
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In the context of the best evidence rule, this Court explained, "Trial courts are 
afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence; thus we will not 
disturb a trial court's ruling whether to admit or exclude evidence absent an abuse of 
discretion." Vigil v. Div. of Child & Family Servs., 107 P.3d 716, 718 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005) (citing Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Utah 2000)). In Gorostieta, 
the Utah Supreme Court explained that "[t]he admissibility of an item of evidence is a 
legal question. However, the trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining 
whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its ruling will not be overturned unless there is 
an abuse of discretion." 17 P.3d at 1114 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See 
also State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In the absence of an abuse 
of discretion, the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be 
disturbed.") 
In its practical application, Weinstein's Federal Evidence explained that parties 
offering evidence are "rarely precluded from producing significant relevant evidence 
because of the best evidence rule." WEINSTEIN'S FED. EVID. § 1002.04(3). Instead of 
working as an inflexible bar to the entry of evidence, "[t]he function of the best evidence 
rule today is not to accord victory to the party who best follows the rules, but to ensure 
that the trier of fact is presented with the most accurate evidence practicable in those 
situations where informed legal judgment has concluded that precision is essential." 
WEINSTEIN'S FED. EVID. § 1002.04(3). 
How to apply rules 1002 and 1003 to the instant matter is best illustrated by this 
Court's decision in Nielsen v. Estate ofHefferon, 1999 UT App 317. In Nielsen, the trial 
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court concluded that the best evidence rule "prevented consideration of extrinsic evidence 
to determine the parties' intent and the scope and content" of an agreement entered into 
by the parties. Id. at 3-4. This Court overturned the trial court's exclusion of the evidence 
and held that the trial court should have admitted the subject documents. Id. at 4. In so 
doing, this Court explained: 
The best evidence rule provides that the original writing is required to prove the 
content of such writing. The trial court erred by relying on these provisions in that 
plaintiff does not dispute the content of the release produced by defendant. 
Rather, plaintiff claims that defendant either fraudulently induced her into signing 
the release or fraudulently altered the release. The best evidence rule has no 
application to the admissibility of plaintiff s evidence supporting these claims. 
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
This case is similar to Nielsen because Robert is not contesting that the duplicates 
(exhibits 2 and 9) were inaccurate copies of the originals. At the time of the hearing, 
Robert's attorney objected to the admissibility of exhibits 2 and 9 by saying that "if it's 
being submitted for the purpose of establishing at one point in time there were two 
originals I'd have no objection to that." Trans., 57:17-19. See also Appellant's Brief, 21. 
Robert's attorney then stated that he would have to object if "it's being submitted for the 
purposes of helping the court deal with the administration of this estate for interpreting 
the estate" because he thought that "we need the originals for the court to see what to 
interpret." Trans. 57:19-23. Significantly, Robert's attorney then explained that "if it's 
simply establishing that at one point in time there were two now missing originals I have 
no objection to it being admitted for that limited purpose just establishing that at some 
point there were two." Trans. 57:23-58:1. In other words, Robert did not, and apparently 
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does not, question that exhibits 2 and 9 are accurate duplicates of the original documents 
(exhibits 2A and 9A). In fact, exhibits 2 and 2A, as well as 9 and 9A, are exactly 
identical. 
Significantly, based on Nielsen, Robert's assertions that "a genuine question ... as 
to the authenticity of the original" are not addressable in the context of the best evidence 
rule. As in the case of Nielsen, Robert is questioning the events surrounding the creation 
of the Update to Trust. Robert has asserted that the subject exhibits are a result of undue 
influence or fraud on the part of Kathy. However, as in the case of Nielsen where 
assertions concerning fraudulent inducement did not preclude the admissibility of 
evidence, the best evidence rule does not preclude the admission of the original and 
duplicate Updates to Trust in this case because of assertions concerning undue influence, 
lack of capacity, or fraud. Given that the best evidence rule was not created to address 
with the admissibility of exhibits in this context and on these grounds, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's decision to admit exhibits 2, 2A, 9, and 9A into evidence. 
Furthermore, even assuming that a genuine question as to the authenticity of the 
exhibits related to undue influence and/or lack of capacity could preclude the trial court 
from admitting the subject exhibits into evidence based upon rules 1002 and 1003 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court received sufficient evidence during the course of 
the hearing to determine that no genuine question existed. For example, during the 
hearing, the trial court received evidence from the notary public —Lyle Gertsch —who 
7
 Mr. Gertsch was the only independent witness offered at the time of the hearing by the 
parties. David McBeth represented the trustee. Central Bank. The other parties all 
41 
witnessed Ina's signature of the original Updates to Trust. See Trans. 62:22-65:11. 
Among other things, Mr. Gertsch testified concerning his visit to the home where Ina was 
living and his interactions with her. See id. The trial court also received testimony from 
Kathy concerning conversations with her mother related to Ina's frustration with Robert 
and the amendment of the trust, and Kathy's preparation of the Updates to Trust pursuant 
to her mother's request. See Trans. 62:22-65:11, 120:6-15, 120:23-122:22. 
Significantly, the trial court ultimately determined that Ina did not lack the 
capacity to create the Updates to Trust and that Ina was not unduly influenced to create 
the Updates to Trust. See R. 472-474. Given that the trial court received sufficient 
evidence to make an ultimate decision concerning the undue influence and capacity 
issues for the case as a whole, the trial court also received sufficient evidence to 
determine that no genuine question existed concerning authenticity that would preclude 
the admission of exhibits 2, 2A, 9, and 9 A. For those reasons, this Court should affirm 
the trial court's holding to admit the subject exhibits into evidence. 
B. Based Upon Information Received at Hearing, Trial Court Acted Within Its 
Discretion by Admitting Exhibits 2A and 9A into Evidence. 
The trial court acted within its broad discretion when it admitted into evidence the 
original Updates to Trust following the hearing given the extensive evidence related to 
the duplicate Updates to Trust presented to the trial court at the hearing and because the 
admission does not prejudice Robert. Furthermore, this Court should affirm the trial 
claimed some sort of interest in the Trust. Mr. Gertsch had no interest, beneficial or 
otherwise, in the outcome of the hearing. 
8
 See UTAH CODE § 78-25-9 ("Any writing may be proved ... (1) by any one who saw the 
writing executed/') 
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court's decision to receive Exhibits 2A and 9A into evidence given Robert's failure to 
marshal the evidence supporting an abuse of discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained, "A trial court has broad discretion to admit or 
exclude evidence and its determination typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an 
abuse of discretion." State v. Whittle, 989 P.2d 52, 58 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, 
"[although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, we review a trial 
court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165, 8 (Utah 2003). An abuse of discretion takes place if the trial 
court acts unreasonably. Whittle, 989 P.2d at 58. See also Glacier Land Co., LLC, v. 
Claudia Klawe & Assocs., LLC, 154 P.3d 852, 858 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (The trial 
court's decision should not be overturned "unless it is beyond the limits of 
reasonability."). 
In this case, the trial court acted within its broad discretion to admit evidence 
when it admitted the originals of the Update to Trust following the close of evidence. 
During the course of the hearing, the trial court received extensive evidence concerning 
the execution and purpose of the Updates to Trust. See, e.g., Trans. 77:7-78:9, 120:6-15, 
120:23-122:22, 280:12-16. Among the evidence received by the trial court concerning the 
execution, the public notary who witnessed the execution of the Updates to Trust verified 
their authenticity. See Trans. 62:22-65:11. Additionally, the trial court received extensive 
evidence from both Robert and Kathy, as well as others, related to whether the Updates to 
Trust reflected Ina's intent. See Trans. 120:6-15, 120:23-122:22. See also Exhibit 15 ffl[ 2, 
5; Trans. 189:17-190:3. 
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Robert has asserted that admission of the original Updates to Trust following the 
close of the hearing was prejudicial because Robert did not have an opportunity to 
respond to the documents that purported to be originals, see Appellant's Brief, 14 & 23; 
because it deprived Robert of the opportunity to confront witnesses, examine documents, 
and object to out-of court statements, see id. at 23; and because Robert was not provided 
with the opportunity to cross-examine Kathy as to why the documents were not produced 
at the original hearing, see id. at 24. However, based on the extensive testimony 
previously received by the trial court concerning the duplicate Updates to Trust, the trial 
court did not act beyond the limits of reasonability by not providing Robert with an 
opportunity to question Kathy and Jenny concerning the originals. Furthermore, any 
prejudice caused by the trial court not permitting Robert to re-open the hearing was 
ameliorated by the trial court's own refusal to receive into evidence the additional 
affidavits provided by Kathy and Jenny that accompanied the original Updates to Trust. 
See R. 477. 
In the end, the trial court simply had to compare the original Updates to Trust with 
the duplicates previously provided to it to determine whether the documents were 
identical. Upon determining that they were identical, and that sufficient evidence 
previously provided a foundation for admission of the duplicates, the trial court acted 
within its discretion to admit the originals. For that reason, the trial court acted within its 
broad discretion when it admitted the original Updates to Trust into evidence. 
Significantly, even if the trial court acted beyond the bounds of reasonability in 
admitting into evidence the original Updates to Trust, Robert was not prejudiced by the 
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admission given that identical photocopies were previously admitted by the Court and 
extensive testimony was received by the trial court related to the Updates to the Trust of 
Ina C. Holman. This Court explained that "even if evidence is erroneously admitted, that 
fact alone is insufficient to set aside a verdict unless it has had a substantial influence in 
bringing about the verdict." Glacier Land Co., LLC, 154 P.3d at 858. This principle is 
consistent with rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides that error on a 
ruling on evidence "may not be predicated on a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected." Given that the trial court had already 
received into evidence the identical photocopies of the Updates to Trust and 
corresponding testimony, the admission of the originals had no appreciable effect on the 
trial court's ultimate judgment. For that reason, no prejudice has resulted from the 
admission that would require this Court to overturn the trial court's admission of the 
original Updates to Trust. 
Finally, Robert has failed to marshal the evidence necessary for this Court to 
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting exhibits 2, 2A, 9, and 
9A. Consequently, because Robert "has failed to marshal the evidence supporting" the 
admission of the subject exhibits, this Court cannot "conclude that the trial court abused 
its discretion." United Park City Mines Co., 140 P.3d at 1209. For the reasons stated 
above, this Court should affirm the trial court's admission of the original Updates to 
Trust into evidence in this matter. 
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C. Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence Is Inapplicable to the Instant 
Case. 
Robert has asserted on appeal that the trial court should not have admitted Exhibits 
2 and 9 into evidence given that the exceptions listed in rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence were not satisfied. However, rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not 
apply in this case because the exhibits were not "other evidence of contents," but 
duplicates as defined in rule 1001(4). 
The purpose of rule 1004 is not to exclude duplicates, the admissibility of which is 
addressed in rule 1003, but to address the admissibility of "other evidence of the contents 
of a writing, recording, or photograph." See UTAH R. EVID. 1003-1004. Rule 1004 allows 
for the admission of other evidence of the contents of writings under specific exceptions 
involving lost or destroyed originals, unobtainable originals, originals in the possession 
of the opposing party, or other collateral matters. UTAHR. EVID. 1004. 
Duplicates as defined in rule 1001(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence are not the 
"other evidence of the contents of a writing" that is the subject of rule 1004. Other 
evidence is typically things such as oral testimony to prove the content of a lost letter, see 
Klein v. Frank, 534 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1976). For that reason, rule 1004 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence are inapplicable in determining the admissibility of Exhibits 2, 
2A, 9, and 9A. 
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IV. Robert Holman's Appeal Is Frivolous. 
This Court should award the Appellees there attorney's fees given that Robert's 
appeal is frivolous. Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides the 
following: 
Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a 
motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in 
Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may 
order that the damage be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 33(a). Rule 33(b) defines frivolous appeal as uone that is not grounded 
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law." UTAH R. APP. 33(b). 
In this case, Robert's appeal is not grounded in fact. As explained above, the trial 
court received and admitted into evidence extensive evidence of Ina's intent to amend her 
trust. Regardless, Robert has appealed this matter and failed to cite any of the evidence 
that served as the trial court's bases for finding intent. For that reason, Robert's appeal is 
frivolous and this Court should award the Appellees their attorney's fees incurred in 
responding to this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the trial court's findings given that Robert completely 
failed to marshal the evidence necessary to contest the trial court's findings that the 
Update to Trust reflected Ina's intent and that no genuine question as to the authenticity 
of the Update to Trust exists. 
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Furthermore, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding that the Update to 
Trust reflected Ina's intent given that the clear weight of the evidence supports the trial 
court's finding. Specifically, the trial court properly found that the Update to Trust 
reflected Ina's intent because the Update to Trust states the reasons for which Ina 
executed it, Ina possessed the capacity to amend her trust and was not unduly influenced, 
and because her intent to correct the distributions to her family—namely Robert—was 
testified to at the time of the hearing. 
The trial court acted reasonably when it admitted into evidence the duplicate and 
original Updates to Trust. No genuine question existed concerning the authenticity of the 
original Update to Trust that would merit the exclusion of the duplicates under rule 1003 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court received extensive evidence from the 
public notary who witnessed the documents execution, as well as Kathy, that outlined the 
Update to Trust's purpose, preparation, and execution. With regards to the admission into 
evidence of the original Updates to Trust following the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 
court acted reasonably in admitting the originals because of the extensive evidence before 
the trial court concerning the duplicates, because the trial court declined to receive 
testimony from any of the parties, and because the trial court could have determined that 
the originals were identical to the duplicates by simply comparing the documents. 
Finally, even if the trial court did not act reasonably in admitting the original Updates to 
Trust, Robert was not prejudiced by the admission because all of the information 
contained in the originals was previously admitted into evidence in the duplicate Updates 
to Trust. 
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For the stated reasons, the Appellees respectfully request that the trial court be 
affirmed in all respects. Furthermore, the Appellees respectfully request that the trial 
court award them their attorney's fees incurred in responding to Robert's frivolous 
appeal. 
DATED this V day of October, 2007. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Mark F- Ropinsor 
Morgai/Pne 
Attorneys for Kathleen Robinson, 
Jenevieve Hoiman & Spencer Family 
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ADDENDUM 
1. In re Estate of Reichenberger, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. Lexis 315, 9-10 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2007). 
2. Agreement Establishing the Ina C. Holman Trust dated July 27, 1990, Hearing 
Exhibit 1. 
3. Letter from Robert Holman to Ina C. Holman, undated, Hearing Exhibit 15. 
4. Letter from Robert Holman to Ina C. Holman, dated October 21, 1994, Hearing 
Exhibit 16. 
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Exhibit 1 
In re Estate of Reichenberger, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. Lexis 315, 9-10 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2007). 
LEXSEE 2007 MINN. APP. UNPUB. LEXIS 3 J 5 
Positive 
As of: Oct 08, 2007 
In re: Estate of Edward J. Reichenberger, a/k/a Edward Reichenberger, Deceased. 
A06-653 
COURT OF APPEALS OF MINNESOTA 
2007Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 315 
April 10, 2007, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] THIS OPINION WILL BE UNPUB-
LISHED AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS 
PROVIDED BY MINNESOTA STATUTES. 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Review denied by In re 
Estate of Reichenberger, 2007 Minn. LEXIS 330 (Minn., 
June 19, 2007) 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
COUNSEL: For Linda Soukup, Appellant: Mary R. 
Vasaly, Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, LLP, Min-
neapolis, MN. 
For Dale Hilk, Respondent: Patrick J. Neaton, Neaton & 
Puklich, PLLP, Minnetonka, MN. 
JUDGES: Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding 
Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Dietzen, Judge. 
OPINION BY: DIETZEN 
OPINION 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION 
DIETZEN, Judge 
Appellant challenges the district court order and re-
sulting judgment which, inter alia, admitted a June 2001 
will of testator to probate, but voided a competing will 
executed four months later due to undue influence upon 
the testator, and awarded attorney fees against appellant 
and a non-party. Appellant argues that the district court 
failed to apply the proper burden of proof to the evidence 
and that the findings and conclusions of the district court 
were not supported by the evidence or law. We affirm in 
part and reverse in part. 
FACTS 
This is a contest involving competing wills executed 
by Edward Reichenberger [*2] (testator) on June 7, 
2001 (the June will), in which respondent Dale Hilk is a 
residuary beneficiary, and a will executed on October 17, 
2001 (the October will), in which appellant Linda Sou-
kup and non-party Richard Blanchard, are residuary 
beneficiaries. Testator died on November 8, 2003. Each 
party filed a petition to probate the will under which that 
party was a residuary beneficiary. 
Testator, who was born in July 1913, together with 
his older brother, John Reichenberger, inherited a 152-
acre farm which they owned and resided on from April 
1945 until their respective deaths. The Reichenberger 
farm (farm) is located in Carver County between Waco-
nia and St. Bonifacius. Soukup and Blanchard lived near 
the Reichenberger farm, and their relationship with the 
Reichenbergers dates back to the mid-1980s when Sou-
kup and Blancard sought to purchase boulders from the 
Reichenbergers for their landscaping business. Hilk, born 
out of wedlock in July 1935, is the son of John Reichen-
berger. Although Hilk lived in the vicinity of the farm, 
he did not have any significant contact with either testa-
tor or John until the early 1980s. 
The farmhouse, occupied by testator and John, was 
dilapidated and [*3] possessed no electricity, plumbing, 
running water, or heating system, other than a small 
wood-burning stove. Soot and grease covered the floor, 
walls, and ceiling, and numerous windowpanes were 
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broken, covered only in cardboard The state of the 
farmhouse was not due to poverty, but rather the lifestyle 
choice of the two bachelor brothers 
In May 1988, the Reichenbergers signed a purchase 
agreement/option in favor of William and Suzanne John-
son When the Reichenbergers refused to comply with 
the terms of the agreement, the Johnsons brought a law-
suit In January 1994, the parties settled the lawsuit, 
which was approved by the district court Later, the Rei-
chenbergers, with the assistance of Soukup and Blanch-
ard, hired a new attorney to set aside the settlement 
Those efforts were unsuccessful 
Hilk retired in October 1997 and began a practice of 
visiting testator and John at the farm three days a week 
Subsequently, Hilk began handlmg some financial mat-
ters for testator and John, who were 84 and 87 years old 
respectively, and arranging for the purchase of burial 
plots at the local cemetery In April 1998, Hilk consulted 
with attorney Paul Melchert, who prepared a power of 
attorney [x4] (POA), and assisted testator in the execu-
tion of a will The 1998 will provided, inter aha, that the 
residuary of testator's estate would go to his nephews— 
Hilk and Kay Berrigan—m equal shares and appointed 
Hilk as his personal representative 
In January 2000, Soukup and Blanchard convinced 
testator and John to commence a malpractice claim 
against their former attorneys arising out of the Johnson 
litigation When Hilk discovered the existence of the 
malpractice lawsuit, he had Melchert send a letter to 
Soukup and Blanchard advising them that Hilk was the 
attorney-in-fact for testator and John, and urged them to 
stay away from the brothers and terminate the litigation 
But Soukup and Blanchard arranged a meeting with 
attorney John Choi to pursue the litigation Following a 
meeting with the Reichenbergers, Choi had them execute 
revocations of Hilk's POA and name Soukup and 
Blanchard as their new attorneys-in-fact, but did not no-
tify Hilk 
In April 2001, John was admitted to a Waconia hos-
pital In June 2001, testator met with Melchert to change 
his will The will (June will) provided, inter aha, that the 
residue of his estate went to Hilk, and that he was inten-
tionally omitting [*5] all other persons except for a rela-
tive, Joan Stoltman, who received three thousand dollars 
When Melchert became aware that Soukup was 
POA for testator and John, he contacted attorney Kerry 
Olson and, on the basis of a conflict of interest due to his 
dealings with Hilk, asked Olson to speak with testator 
Attorney Olson met with testator at the farm on Septem-
ber 7 2001, and observed the "appalling' living condi-
tions During the meetmg, testator stated that he wanted 
Hilk to be his attorney-in-fact because Hilk was a rela-
tive who lived in Waconia and "looked out" for him 
Testator also expressed his desire that attorney Choi con-
tinue to pursue the Johnson litigation 
Olson then prepared and had testator execute a POA 
appointing Hilk as attorney-in-fact, and sent a letter to 
attorney Choi In his letter to Choi, Olson observed that 
testator was "clearly a vulnerable adult," but that he "re-
tains mental alertness" and "expresses himself ade-
quately," but "is 88 years old " Olson also instructed 
Choi that Soukup and Blanchard must cease interfering 
in testator's life decisions, but that Choi could continue to 
pursue the Johnson litigation 
Subsequently, a dispute arose in which Hilk [x6] 
accused Soukup and Blanchard of interfering with the 
lives and affairs of testator and John Attorneys Choi and 
Olson agreed to visit testator at the farm on September 
20, 2001, m an attempt to resolve the dispute When Ol-
son arrived, he was surprised to see Soukup and Blanch-
ard at the meeting and requested that they leave Olson 
believed testator's demeanor had changed considerably 
from his previous meetings with him in which testator 
was lucid, clear, and reasonably animated But on this 
date testator was "like a deer in headlights" and "frozen 
in his chair " During the meeting, Blanchard asked testa-
tor, "You don't want him as your attorney any more, do 
you," and testator responded, "No " At that point Olson 
left the farmhouse considering himself to have been fired 
by testator 
Soukup and Blanchard then made arrangements for 
testator to meet with attorney William Koenig to execute 
a new will At the meetmg, testator requested that a will 
be completed immediately because he was going into the 
hospital that same day, which was not true Because it 
was a relatively short will, Koenig prepared it, and con-
trary to his usual practice had testator execute it that 
same day The October [*7] will made no reference to 
testator's desire to be buried m the local cemetery, and 
left the residuary of his estate m equal one-third shares to 
Soukup, Blanchard, and Joan Stoltman Soukup and 
Blanchard then took testator to the Carver County Court-
house where he deposited the will at the probate depart-
ment The two court employees that spoke to testator 
made the following notation on the will jacket "[Testa-
tor] did not know the day or year when he signed the 
back We had to tell him Don't think he was of sound 
mmd " 
At trial, the parties vigorously disputed each other's 
motivations, the validity of the October will, and whether 
it was the subject of undue influence by Soukup and 
Blanchard Following a trial, the district court filed ex-
tensive findings of fact conclusions of law, and an order 
and judgment admitting the June 2001 will to probate, 
appointing Hilk as personal representative and conclud-
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ing that the October will was void and the product of 
undue influence by Soukup and Blanchard. In the main, 
the court credited the testimony of Hilk and discredited 
the testimony of Soukup and Blanchard. Also, the district 
court concluded that the estate is entitled to judgment 
[*8] against Soukup and Blanchard for attorney fees that 
the estate had incurred. This appeal follows. 
DECISION 
I. 
Soukup argues that the district court erred in holding 
that the October will was invalid because it was the 
product of undue influence by Soukup and non-party 
Blanchard. The district court's findings of fact will not be 
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. 
P. 52.01; In re Estate of Anderson, 384 N. W.2d 518, 520 
(Minn. App. 1986). "Findings are 'clearly erroneous' only 
if 'the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.'" Id. (quoting In re Estate of Congdon, 309 
N.W.2d 261, 266 n.7 (Minn. 1981)). The existence of 
undue influence is a question of fact. In re Estate of 
Reay, 249 Minn. 123, 124, 81 N. W.2d277, 279 (1957). 
Initially, Soukup argues that the district court erred 
by adopting verbatim Hilk's proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The verbatim adoption of a 
party's proposed findings and conclusions is "hardly 
commendable" as it raises the question of whether the 
district court "independently [*9] evaluated each party's 
testimony and evidence." Pederson v. State, 649 N. W.2d 
161, 163 (Minn. 2002); Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 
590 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 
1993). But, standing alone, it does not constitute grounds 
for reversal. Pederson, 649 N.W.2d at 163; Dukes v. 
State, 621 N.W.2d246, 259 (Minn. 2001). 
When a district court adopts a party's proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim, a "careful 
and searching review of the record" is required. Dukes, 
621 N.W.2d at 258. Here, the district court did adopt 
Hilk's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Thus, our caselaw requires that we conduct a careful and 
searching review of the record to determine whether the 
district court's findings are clearly erroneous. 
Soukup also argues that the district court failed to 
require that Hilk prove undue influence by "clear and 
convincing evidence" because the standard of proof is 
not mentioned in the district court's order. It is well set-
tled that the will contestant must establish undue influ-
ence by clear and convincing proof. Minn. Stat. § 524.3-
407 [*10] (2006); In re Estate of Pundt, 280 Minn. 102, 
104, 157 N.W.2d839, 841 (1968). But the failure of the 
district court to mention this standard of proof in its or-
der does not, ipso facto, establish that the district court 
did not require it, particularly when it was briefed and 
argued by both parties. Thus, our review necessarily fo-
cuses on whether clear and convincing evidence exists in 
the record to support the district court's finding that the 
will was the product of undue influence. 
We will invalidate a will that is the product of undue 
influence if it is proven that another person exercised 
influence over the testator so that the will reflects the 
intent of the other person and not of the testator. Estate 
of Reay, 249 Minn, at 126, 81 N. W.2d at 280; In re Es-
tate of Torgersen, 711 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. App. 
2006), review denied (Minn. Jun. 20, 2006). "Undue in-
fluence must be such as to substitute the will of the per-
son exercising it for that of the testator, thereby making 
the written result express the purpose and intent of such 
person, not those of the testator. "In re Estate of Marsden, 
217 Minn. 1, 9, 13 N.W.2d 765, 770 (1944). [*11] "It 
must be equivalent to moral coercion or constraint over-
powering the will of the testator," and "must operate at 
the very time the will is made and dominate and control 
its making." Id. Direct evidence of undue influence is 
generally not available and circumstantial evidence can 
be sufficient. In re Estate of Olson, 176 Minn. 360, 365, 
223 N.W. 677, 679(1929). 
The supreme court has identified six factors to de-
termine whether undue influence has been exerted upon 
a testator. In re Estate of Wilson, 223 Minn. 409, 413, 27 
N.W.2d 429, 432 (1947); In re Estate of Opsahl, 448 
N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. App. 1989). We turn to the six 
factors. 
A. Opportunity to Exercise Influence 
Soukup argues that she did not isolate testator or 
make him dependent upon her, and thus no "opportunity" 
existed for her to exercise undue influence. The district 
court concluded that Soukup and Blanchard "made [tes-
tator] dependent upon them for his continued ability to 
live at the Reichenberger Farm and Soukup had [testa-
tor's Power of Attorney." 
During the period immediately before and after the 
execution of the October will, Soukup [*12] was testa-
tor's attorney-in-fact and frequently visited testator at the 
farm, at a time when because of John's hospitalization, 
testator was regularly alone. And Soukup and Blanchard 
made the appointment with attorney Koenig to draft the 
October will, transported testator to the office, and 
brought him to the county clerk's office to file it. Thus, 
clear and convincing evidence exists in the record that 
Soukup had the opportunity to exercise influence on tes-
tator. 
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B. Active Participation in the Prepara-
tion of the Will 
Soukup argues that the evidence is insufficient to 
demonstrate Soukup's active participation in the prepara-
tion of the will. The district court found that Soukup and 
Blanchard "selected the attorney to draft the will, drove 
[testator] to the attorney's office, waited with him while 
the will was drafted and executed, then drove him to the 
Carver County courthouse where the will was deposited 
with the clerk's office." The district court also found that 
"it is a certainty that Blanchard and Soukup told [testa-
tor] what provisions to include in his October 17, 2001 
will, and that Blanchard and Soukup read the October 17, 
2001 will before it was deposited [*13] with the Carver 
County Probate Court." 
Undue influence may be proven by circumstantial 
evidence. Estate of Olson, 176 Minn, at 365, 223 N. W. at 
679. Here, Soukup was actively involved in every step of 
the process of selecting the attorney and arranging the 
meeting with testator, driving testator to the attorney's 
office and waiting for him while the will was drafted and 
executed, and driving testator to the courthouse to de-
posit the will. And Soukup was substantially benefited as 
a beneficiary under the new October will. Based on its 
observations of the witness and all of the circumstances, 
the district court concluded that Soukup was actively 
involved in the preparation of the will and its provisions. 
On this record, the circumstantial evidence supports the 
district court's finding by clear and convincing evidence. 
C. Confidential Relationship 
Soukup concedes she had a confidential relationship 
with testator because of her POA. 
D. Disinheritance of Those Who 
Probably Would Have Been Remem-
bered 
Soukup argues that this factor does not militate in 
any particular direction because testator had a habit of 
changing his beneficiaries. [*14] "But an entire change 
from former testamentary intentions is a strong circum-
stance to support a charge of undue influence." In re Es-
tate of Olson, 227 Minn. 289, 298, 35 N.W.2d 439, 446 
(1948). "This is especially true where the effect of the 
change is to give the beneficiary charged with exercising 
undue influence a "larger" share of testator's estate than 
she would have received otherwise." Id. 
Here, the record contains evidence that Hilk main-
tained, along with his family, a familial relationship with 
testator; handled his financial affairs; did chores around 
the farm; "looked out" for testator's well-being; was the 
main beneficiary in each of testator's two prior wills; and 
that the October will exhibited an entire, change from 
former testamentary intentions in favor of Hilk to Sou-
kup and Blanchard. 
E. Singularity of the Will Provisions 
Soukup argues the October will was not "singular" 
because she was only one of three beneficiaries. Respon-
dent argues that the October will was singular in elimi-
nating him as a beneficiary. The district court found that 
"[t]he provisions of the [will] are 'singular' because Hilk 
is purportedly disinherited [*15] without being men-
tioned, and there is no mention of [testator]'s previously 
expressed burial preference." 
Singularity of the will provisions focuses on the na-
ture and extent of the changes in the will from the testa-
tor's previous will. Here, the residuary beneficiary desig-
nation was the most significant change in the will, and 
apart from the elimination of where testator desired to be 
buried, was the "singular" change in the October will. 
That provision replaced Hilk as a beneficiary with Sou-
kup, Blanchard and Stoltman. On this record, it was not 
clear error for the district court to find that the October 
will provisions were "singular" in favor of Soukup and 
Blanchard. 
F. Exercise of Influence or Persuasion 
to Induce the Testator to Act 
Soukup argues that the district court failed to men-
tion this factor in its "memorandum" and, therefore, that 
its conclusion regarding undue influence was flawed. But 
Soukup fails to provide any authority that such omission 
is dispositive, particularly when this factor is discussed 
extensively in the district court's order. Specifically, the 
district court found that Soukup and Blanchard "exer-
cised undue influence over [testator]. [*16] " 
Here, the district court found that prior to the Sep-
tember 20, 2001 meeting, testator had agreed to spend 
the winter at the nursing home. Testator stated to Olson 
that he could not stay at the farmhouse that winter be-
cause it was a "hovel." Soukup and Blanchard were able 
to exercise undue influence over testator at the meeting 
by convincing him that Hilk "was holding John as a pns-
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oner" at the nursing home, and that he intended to do the 
same with him. Soukup admitted at trial that there was 
no factual basis to conclude that Hilk was holding John a 
"prisoner" at the nursing home. Based on Olson's testi-
mony, the district court found that testator was "not him-
self and that Soukup and Blanchard "definitely have 
him in control." 
Soukup and Blanchard told testator that they would 
have gas heat and telephone installed at the farmhouse so 
that he could continue to live there, and that they would 
bring him drinking water and food. ' The district court 
found that they did so to make testator "dependent upon 
them for his ability to continue to live at the Reichenber-
ger farm." 
1 Testator agreed to stay alone at the farm that 
winter. 
[*17] Subsequently, Soukup and Blanchard ar-
ranged a meeting with Koenig so that testator could exe-
cute a new will. Attorney Koenig met with testator, pre-
pared the will, and had the will executed the same day. 
Attorney Choi stated that he was not aware that Soukup 
and Blanchard had taken testator to a different attorney 
to prepare the October will. Two days after testator exe-
cuted the October will, Soukup and Blanchard had a gas 
heater and telephone installed at the farm. 
On conflicting testimony, the district court made 
credibility assessments which this court will not disturb 
absent an abuse of discretion. See Tews v. Geo. A. Hor-
mel & Co., 430 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Minn. 1988). And the 
district court's finding that the October will was the 
product of undue influence is supported by the findings 
and clear and convincing evidence in the record. 
Soukup also argues that the district court erred by 
finding that the October will was void because it is a 
self-proved will, the issue was not raised in the district 
court, and the record contradicts the district court's find-
ing. Hilk does not contest the argument. But because we 
find that the October will was the product of undue in-
fluence, [*18] the question of whether it is void is moot. 
II. 
Soukup argues that the district court erred by grant-
ing testator's estate a judgment against Soukup and 
Blanchard for attorney fees under Minn Stat. § 524.3-
720 (2006). Hilk argues that no fee petition was submit-
ted by attorney Eric Dammeyer,2 no judgment for a spe-
cific amount of attorney fees was entered and, therefore, 
there is nothing for this court to determine. The district 
court's order regarding attorney fees is generally subject 
to an abuse of discretion standard. Torgerson, 711 
N.W.2d at 550. The court's findings will be set aside if 
they are clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Balafas, 225 
N.W.2d 539, 541 (Minn. 1975). However, where the de-
cision is based on the court's application of a statute to 
the uncontested facts, the construction and application of 
the statute is a question of law, and is reviewed de novo. 
Torgerson, 711 N. W.2dat 550. 
2 Dammeyer represented Linda Soukup at the 
district court. 
[*19] Minn. Stat. § 524.3-720 provides in relevant 
part: 
Any personal representative or person 
nominated as personal representative who 
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in 
good faith, whether successful or not, or 
any interested person who successfully 
opposes the allowance of a will, is entitled 
to receive from the estate necessary ex-
penses and disbursements including rea-
sonable attorneys' fees incurred. 
Absent a finding of bad faith, a personal representative 
has a statutory right to recover attorney fees. Whether a 
person is acting in bad faith is a question of fact. In re 
Estate o/Evenson, 505 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Minn. App. 1993) 
(reviewing district court's finding of good faith under the 
clearly erroneous standard). 
The only finding made by the district court on the 
question of attorney fees provided: "Since Dammeyer's 
representation was for the benefit of [testatorj's estate, he 
is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees from the estate 
and the estate is entitled to judgment against Linda Sou-
kup, and Richard Blanchard in the amount of attorney's 
fees awarded to Dammeyer." 
But we have no underlying motion for attorney 
[*20] fees outlining the nature and amount of the fees 
requested, no finding of bad faith by Soukup, and no 
legal basis for an award of attorney fees against non-
party Blanchard. Thus, we have no support in the record 
for an award of attorney fees. Thus, we reverse the find-
ing regarding attorney fees without prejudice to any 
party. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
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AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE 
INA C. HOLMAN FAMILY TRUST 
THIS AGREEMENT is made this 3*1 r day of July, 1990, by and 
between INA C. HOLMAN, (hereinafter referred to as the "Trustor") 
and INA C. HOLMAN (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 
"Trustee"). This Agreement establishes the INA C. HOLMAN FAMILY 
TRUST for the benefit of the Trustor and then her beneficiaries. 
ARTICLE ONE 
Property Transferred to the Trustees 
The Trustor has paid over, assigned, granted, conveyed, 
transferred and delivered to the Trustee the property described in 
Schedule "A, " which is, or will be attached hereto and made a part 
hereof. The Trustee hereby agrees to hold, administer, and 
distribute, in accordance with the provisions hereof, the property 
described in said Schedule and any other property acceptable to the 
Trustee which anyone may desire to add to the trust. All property 
initially or hereafter transferred to the trust, including property 
passing to the trust by the Trustorfs Will, hereinafter sometimes 
is termed the "Trust Estate." 
ARTICLE TWO 
Family Members 
At the time of the execution of this Trust, the Trustor is a 
widow and has four (4) children: KATHLEEN ROBINSON, JENEVIEVE 
OLSON, PHYLLIS HALL and ROBERT HOLMAN. 
ARTICLE THREE 
Provisions for the Trustor During Her Lifetime 
The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the Trust 
Estate for the exclusive benefit of the Trustor and shall collect 
and distribute the income and principal as follows: 
3.1 Distributions Upon Request, During the Trustor's 
lifetime, the Trustees shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the 
Trustor as much of the net income and principal of the Trust Estate 
as the Trustor may request from time to time. 
3-2 Distributions By the Trustee. During the Trustor's 
lifetime, the Trustee shall also pay to or apply for the benefit of 
the Trustor such sums from the income and principal of the Trust 
Estate as shall be necessary or advisable from time to time to 
provide for her medical care, happiness, comfort and welfare. 
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ARTICLE FOUR 
Right Revoke or Amend the Trust 
During her lifetime the Trustor may: (1) revoke part or all 
of this trust; (2) add other property to the Trust Estate; (3) 
change the beneficiaries, their respective shares and the plan of 
distribution; and (4) amend this Trust Agreement in any other 
respect. 
ARTICLE FIVE 
Trusteefs Discretionary Provisions 
After the TrustorTs death, the Trustee, in the exercise of her 
sole and absolute discretion, may pay all or any part of the 
Trustor's funeral expenses, legally enforceable claims against the 
Trustor or her estate, reasonable expenses of administration of her 
estate, any allowances by court order to those dependent upon the 
Trustor, and any estate, inheritance, or similar taxes payable by 
reason of the Trustor's death, 
ARTICLE SIX 
Ultimate Distribution of the Trust Estate 
Following the Trustor's death, the Trust Estate shall be held, 
administered and distributed as follows: 
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6.1 Division of Trust Estate. The Trustee shall divide the 
balance of the Trust Estate into equal shares and partial shares as 
follows: (a) One full share for each then living child of the 
Trustors; and (b) one full share for each group composed of the 
then living lawful descendants of each deceased child of the 
Trustors, to be apportioned in partial shares among such 
descendants by right of representation. 
6.2 Distributions of Trust Shares. Any share or partial 
share, as set forth above in Paragraph 6.1 above, set aside for a 
beneficiary who predeceases the Trustor, such share or partial 
share shall be distributed as set forth in this Paragraph 6.2. The 
Trustees may pay to or apply to the benefit of any such Beneficiary 
such sums from the income or principal of her share as the 
Trustees, in the exercise of the TrusteesT discretion, shall deem 
necessary or desirable from time to time for the Beneficiary's 
medical care, education, support and maintenance in reasonable 
comfort, taking into consideration, to the extent the Trustees 
deems advisable, any other income or resources of such Beneficiary 
known to the Trustees. The Trustees shall annually add to the 
principal of each share any undistributed income. 
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6.3 Mandatory Distribution of Beneficiary Shares. After 
division into shares pursuant to Paragraph 6.1, and when a 
Beneficiary attains the age of Twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee 
shall distribute to such Beneficiary all his or her share free of 
this Trust. If a Beneficiary has already attained the age of 
Twenty-one (21) as set forth above at the txme the Trust Estate is 
divided into shares pursuant to Paragraph 6.1, the Trustee shall 
distribute to such Beneficiary all of his or her share, 
respectively, free of this Trust. 
ARTICLE SEVEN 
Appointment of Trustee 
7.1 Appointment. Trustor hereby nominates and appoints INA C. 
HOLMAN as Trustee of this Trust. 
7.2 Appointment of Successor. 
(a) Upon the death, incapacity, resignation or discharge 
of the initial Trustee, the following individuals shall serve as 
Successor Co-Trustees: KATHLEEN ROBINSON, JENEVIEVE OLSSON, 
PHYLLIS HALL and ROBERT HOLMAN. 
(b) Any Trustee or Successor Trustee may resign by 
instrument in writing. 
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(c) Any Successor Trustee shall have all the rights, 
powers, duties, and discretion conferred or imposed on the original 
Trustee, No Successor Trustee shall be obliged to examine the 
accounts and actions of any previous Trustee- No Trustee shall be 
liable for any act or omission unless the same be due to such 
Trustee's own default. 
(d) Any Successor Trustee shall become responsible for 
the Trust Estate only when the same shall be received by said 
Trustee and shall only be responsible to make a reasonable inquiry 
from the records of the prior Trustee which are available-
7.3 Bond and Accountings. The Trustor specifically requests 
and directs that no bond or other security shall be required of any 
Trustee named hereunder. No Trustee hereunder shall be required to 
file any court accountings either during administration or at 
termination of any Trust created hereunder. 
ARTICLE EIGHT 
Incapacity of the Trustor or Trustee 
8.1 Determination of Incapacity- The Trustor or any 
Trustee shall be deemed incapacitated upon the following events 
and upon the following evidences: 
(a) A court order rendered by an appropriate court of the 
place of the subject individual's then residence, holding said 
individual to be legally incapacitated to act in her own behalf, or 
appointing a conservator or other protective; or 
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(b) Duly executed written certificates of two 
disinterested licensed physicians, each certifying that such 
physician has examined said individual and concluded that by reason 
of illness or physical or mental disability, he or she had, at the 
date of said certificate, become incapacitated to act efficiently 
or rationally and prudently in the management of property. 
8.2 Deemed Release of Reserved Rights, If the Trustor is deemed 
incapacitated, she shall also be deemed to have released the rights 
and privileges reserved under Article Four above, except that she 
shall have the continued right of rent-free use and occupancy of 
any residential real property plus the continued right to receive 
as much of the Trust Estate as may be appropriate to provide 
generously for her comfort, support, maintenance, medical care and 
happiness. 
8.3 Termination of Trusteeship. If a Trustee is deemed 
incapacitated, such incapacity shall cause her trusteeship to 
terminate and to pass to the remaining or successor Trustee, who 
shall have full and exclusive power to take any action permitted 
the Trustee under this Trust Agreement. 
8.4 Examination into TrustorTs Possible Incapacity. No 
Trustee (whether then acting or a designated successor) hereunder 
shall be under any duty to institute any examination into the 
Trustor's possible incapacity, but any such examination reasonably 
instituted by a Trustee (excepting all conditionally appointed 
Trustees) shall be deemed made at the Trustor's request, with 
waiver by the Trustor of all provisions of law relating to 
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disclosure of confidential medical information needed in connection 
therewith. The expenses of any such inquiry may be paid from the 
Trust Estate. 
8.5 Objection to Physicians' Certification of Incapacity. 
Should the Trustor, any Trustee or any adult Beneficiary object to 
such physicians1 certifications, such objecting party may seek a 
legal determination of competency in any court of proper 
jurisdiction. During the period of such certification, unless and 
until a court of proper jurisdiction determines otherwise, any 
attempt by the Trustor to exercise the reserved rights and 
privileges or to exercise the authority and power of a Trustee 
shall be void and totally without effect. 
8.6 Revocation of Physicians1 Certification. Any one 
physician's aforesaid certificate may be revoked by a similar 
certificate executed either (1) by the originally certifying 
physician, or (2) by two other disinterested licensed physicians, 
to the effect that the Trustor or Trustee is no longer 
incapacitated. 
8.7 Reassumption of Reserved Rights and Trusteeship. The 
Trustor or Trustee shall be deemed to have reassumed the reserved 
rights and the Trusteeship if the Trustee shall not at all times be 
in possession of at least two unrevoked physiciansT certificates 
and the particular individual is not then subject to a 
conservatorship or other protective proceeding. 
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8.8 Disinterested Licensed Physician. The term "disinterested 
licensed physician" shall mean a physician certified by a 
recognized medical board who is not a beneficiary hereunder, nor 
related to the Trustor or any Trustee within the second degree, nor 
related to any Beneficiary of this Trust or of the Trustor's Will 
within the second degree. 
ARTICLE NINE 
Termination of Trust Estate 
9.1 No Perpetual Trusts. All Trusts hereunder shall in all 
events terminate not later than twenty-one (21) years after the 
death of the last survivor of the group composed of the Trustor and 
those of her descendants living at her death (in the event these 
trusts shall not have previously terminated in accordance with the 
terms hereof). The property held in trust shall then be discharged 
of any trust, and shall immediately vest in and be distributed to 
the persons then entitled to the income; for this purpose only it 
shall be presumed: (a) that any person then entitled to receive 
any discretionary payments from the income or principal of any 
particular trust is entitled to receive the full income; and (b) 
that any class of persons so entitled is entitled to receive all 
such property, to be divided among them by representation. 
9.2 Discretionary Termination by Trustee. If any trust 
hereunder has, in the Trustee's opinion, a fair market value of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) or less, the Trustee, in the 
Trustee's discretion, may terminate such trust and distribute the 
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entire remaining balance of the trust to the persons who are then 
entitled to receive income payments in the proportions in which 
they are at the time of term of termination entitled to receive the 
income. However, if the rights to income are not then fixed, 
distribution may be made in equal shares to such persons as are 
then authorized to receive income payments. Such payments may be 
made to a person regardless of the person's age, or to a person's 
guardian, conservator, or custodian under the Uniform Gifts to 
Minors Act. 
ARTICLE TEN 
Administrative Provisions 
10.1 Broad Powers Granted to the Trustee. The Trustee is 
hereby vested with all of the powers now or hereafter conferred by 
law and all of those powers detailed in the Utah version of the 
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, which are incorporated herein by this 
reference. The trustee is hereby vested with the power and 
authority to manage and control the Trust Estate in such manner as 
the Trustee may deem advisable; and, she shall have, enjoy, and 
exercise all powers and rights over and concerning the Trust Estate 
in the proceeds thereof as fully and amply as though the Trustee 
were the absolute owner of the same. 
10 
10.2 Establishing The TrusteeTs Authority. With respect to any 
asset of the Trust Estate, or any business or investment 
transaction of the Trust Estate: 
(a) The assertion by any Trustee that she is acting 
either alone or with another as a qualified Trustee shall be 
sufficient on its face, and no person shall be put to further 
inquiry into the right of such Trustee to so act. 
(b) No purchaser from or other person dealing with the 
Trustee shall be responsible for the application of any purchase 
money or thing of value paid or delivered to it, but the receipt of 
the Trustee shall be a full discharge; and, no purchaser or other 
person dealing with the Trustee and no issuer, or transfer agent, 
or other agent of any issuer of any securities to which any dealing 
with the Trustee should relate, shall be under any obligation to 
ascertain or inquire into the power of the Trustee to purchase, 
sell, exchange, transfer, mortgage, pledge, lease, distribute or 
otherwise in any manner dispose of or deal with any security or any 
other property held by the Trustee or comprised in the Trust 
Estate. 
(c) Title to the assets comprising the Trust Estate shall 
vest in each successor Trustee by virtue of her appointment and 
acceptance without any further instrument of conveyance or 
transfer. Each successor Trustee shall have all the administrative 
rights, powers, discretions, obligations and immunities of the 
originally named Trustee. 
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(d) The certificate of the Trustee that it is acting 
according to the terms of the Trust Agreement shall fully protect 
all persons dealing with the Trustee, 
10.3 Payments to Persons Under Disability. The Trustee, in the 
Trustee's discretion, may make payments for the benefit of a minor 
or other Beneficiary under disability by making payments to the 
Beneficiary or by applying payments directly for the BeneficiaryTs 
benefit. The Trustee may make payments directly to a minor if, in 
the TrusteeTs judgment, the minor is of sufficient age and maturity 
to spend the money properly. The Trustee shall not be liable for 
the misuse of any payments or applications so made. Further, the 
Trustee is authorized to reimburse the guardian, conservator, or 
other individual with whom a minor Beneficiary resides for 
reasonable expenses incurred in accommodating such Beneficiary to 
the extent that distributions could then be made directly to or for 
such Beneficiary. This authority shall be liberally construed to 
permit payments reasonably necessary to ease the financial burden 
on such person and such person's family resulting from the 
accommodations of such Beneficiary. 
10.4 Spendthrift Provisions. Except as otherwise specifically 
provided herein, no interest in the principal or income of the 
trust shall be anticipated, assigned, encumbered, or subject to any 
creditor's claim or to legal process prior to its actual receipt by 
a Beneficiary. 
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10.5 Division of Trust Property. There need be no physical 
segregation or division of the trusts created hereunder, except as 
such segregation or division may be required by the express terms 
of this Agreement or by the termination of any of the trusts 
created hereunder, but the Trustee shall keep separate accounts for 
the different trusts. The Trustee may hold or invest the assets of 
any of the trusts as undivided common interests. In any case in 
which the Trustee is required to set aside, divide, transfer, or 
distribute any trust property, the Trustee is authorized, in the 
Trustee's discretion, to make the set aside, division, transfer, or 
distribution, on a pro rata or non pro rata basis, in kind, 
including undivided interests in any property, or partly in kind 
and partly in money, at fair market valuations at the date or dates 
set aside, division, transfer, or distribution. For this purpose, 
the Trustees may make such sales of trust property as the Trustee 
deems necessary. 
10.6 Apportionment of Taxes, (a) The amount of any estate, 
inheritance, succession, death or similar taxes attributable to 
property, assets, or beneficial interests includible in the 
Trustor's gross estate for Federal or state estate tax purposes 
shall be apportioned against such property and paid by the 
beneficiaries, trustees, or recipients thereof. 
(b) In making such tax apportionment, if any exception or 
deduction allowed under law because of the relationship of any 
person to the Trustor or the charitable gift, as the case may be, 
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shall be exonerated from paying any portion of such tax. 
Furthermore, in making such tax apportionment, if any property 
included in the Trustor's gross estate for tax purposes (that is 
included in the measure of the tax) does not come into the 
possession or control of the Trustee, the Trustee is authorized to 
recover the pro rata or incremental amount of the tax, as the case 
may be, including interest and penalties attributable thereto, from 
the persons benefitted, in accordance with the applicable 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and any applicable state 
apportionment statutes. 
10.7 Representation of Unknown and Undetermined Beneficiaries. 
In any controversy or proceeding involving the construction, 
operations, or modification of this Trust Agreement, the then 
living competent adult beneficiaries shall represent all minor, 
incapacitated, unknown, and undetermined beneficiaries; any 
agreement reached or order, judgment or decree rendered in such 
proceeding shall be binding upon all concerned, including those 
thus represented. 
10.8 Applicable Law. This instrument is executed by the 
Trustor while residing in the State of Utah and shall be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah in force from time to time. 
10.9 Severability. If any provision hereof is unenforceable, 
the remaining provisions nevertheless shall be carried into effect. 
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ARTICLE ELEVEN 
Definitions 
11.1 As used herein, the masculine, feminine, or neuter gender, 
and the singular or plural number of tense, shall each be deemed to 
include the others whenever the context so indicates. 
11.2 As used herein, the terms "children," "issue," or 
"descendants" shall refer to lineal descendants of all degrees, 
including adopted persons. 
11.3 As used herein, the term "adopted" refers to both legally 
and equitably adopted persons. 
11.4 As used herein, the term "education11 shall be construed to 
include vocational training, college, and postgraduate study, so 
long as pursued to advantage by the Beneficiary, at an institution 
of the Beneficiary's choice. In determining payments to be made for 
such training or education, the Trustee shall take into 
consideration the Beneficiary's related living and travel expenses 
to the extent that they are reasonable. 
11.5 If any beneficiary hereunder should die within six months 
of the Trustor's death, or within six months of any other such 
determinative date, he or she shall be deemed to have predeceased 
the Trustor, etc., for all purposes under this Trust Agreement. 
11.6 Whenever a distribution to descendants "by right of 
representation" is called for by this Trust Agreement, the assets 
subject to distribution are to be divided into as many equal shares 
as there are then living descendants of the nearest degree of 
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living descendants plus deceased descendants of that same degree 
who leave descendants then living; and each such living descendant 
of the nearest degree shall receive one share, and the share of 
each such deceased descendant of that same degree shall be divided 
among his or her descendants in the same manner. 
ARTICLE TWELVE 
Execution and Acknowledgements 
INA C. HOLMAN, the Trustor herein, hereby acknowledge: 
That she has read the foregoing Trust Agreement; 
That it correctly states the terms and conditions under which the 
Trust Estate is to be held, managed, and disposed of by the 
Trustee; 
That this Trust Agreement is approved in all particulars; and 
That this Trust Agreement is accepted and effected as of the day 
and year first above written. 
TRUSTOR AND TRUSTEE: 
INA C. HOLMAN 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ^ ) 
On the yT/ day of July, 1990, before me, the undersigned, a 
Notary Public, personally appeared INA C. HOLMAN personally known 
to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be 
the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same as Trustor and 
Trustee. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
official seal. 
Notary Public 
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INA C. HOLMAN FAMILY TRUST 
Schedule A 
Exhibit 3 
Letter from Robert Holman to Ina C. Holman, undated, Hearing Exhibit 15. 
Dear Mom: 
I'm writing this letter on lotus so that I can do some calculations at 
the same time* I'm going to illustrate two scenarios like I mentioned 
in our phone conversation this morning- First of all let's agree on 
some things that would be the same in each case. You indicated that at 
-he present time your assetts looked something like this: 
?ash and Condominium 
,ake City 80 acres 
'romissory Note ($80,000 face 
$44,000 interest) 
attle 
ther Assets 
Dtal Assets 
$240,000 
$160,000 
$124,000 
$35,000 
$30,000 
$589,000 
: you died today my anticipation would be that each child would end up 
.th one fifth or $117,800. Of course this would not be in cash but it 
lould be one fifth of the value of the assets. I would want to trade 
r
 interest in the estate for the promissory note. That would leave the 
tate looking like this: 
sh and Condominium 
ke City 80 acres 
sh from Robert 
ttle 
ler Assets 
:al Assets 
$240,000 
$160,000 
$6,200 
$35,000 
$30,000 
$471,200 
($124,000-117,800) 
r these assets are to be split 4 ways because I would be out of the 
st. This would leave $117,800 each. 
let's suppose I had paid the promissory note as agreed and had 
n able to pay it off by now. Your estate should look something like 
s now: 
l and Condominium 
3 City 80 acres 
l from Robert 
:le 
>r Assets 
$240,000 
$160,000 
$124,000 Payment of Note 
$35,000 
$30,000 
$589,000 
if you died under this scenario one fifth would be $117,800. I 
strate this point, not to show that I was a good person not paying 
*bts, but to show that the amount to be distributed between your 
5 would have been the same. The decision to distribute like this is 
i product of any current event, it is a decision that was made 5 
; ago. I think that at the time you were thinking clearly and felt 
will honor their parents decisions and not let it cause problems in my 
family. 
If this is not clear let me know. 
Exhibit 4 
Letter from Robert Holman to Ina C. Holman, dated October 21, 1994, Hearing 
Exhibit 16 
October 21, 1994 
Enclosed is the item you requested. As per our phone conversation 
this day, this deed is made to and delivered to the Grantee (Ina c. 
Holman) with the understanding and the commitment from the Grantee 
that she will: 
1. Deliver to the Grantor (Robert J. Holman) the $80,000 
Promissory Note marked "Paid" and, 
2. Remove from and not name Robert J. Holman in any wills or 
trusts now made or to be made. 
I-S PLAlWOTPSr 3EP 
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